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SHAREHOLDER OPPORTUNISM
IN A WORLD OF RISKY DEBT
Richard Squire*
Modern finance is increasingly dominated by derivatives and similar contracts that
create contingent debts, which become payable only upon the occurrence of an uncertain
future event. This Article identifies a pervasive opportunism hazard created by
contingent debt that lawmakers and scholars have overlooked. If liability on a firm's
contingent debt is especially likely to be triggered when the firm is insolvent, the
contract that creates the debt transfers wealth from the firm's creditors to its
shareholders. A firm therefore has incentive to engage in correlation-seeking - that is,
to incur contingent debts that correlate, or that through asset purchases can be made to
correlate, with the firm's insolvency risk. The consequence is an overuse of contingent
debt that destroys social wealth through overinvestment, higher borrowing costs,
financial distress, and potential systemic risk. Correlation-seeking is especially
pernicious because, unlike other forms of shareholder opportunism such as asset
substitution, it can reduce risk to shareholders even as it increases shareholder returns.
Conduct that is consistent with correlation-seeking played a central role in the 2008
financial crisis, causing the deep losses suffered by the three firms to receive the biggest
bailouts: AIG, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. Yet current and proposed legal rules for
derivatives and other contingent debt contracts ignore matters of correlation, increasing
the risk of another financial crash in the future.
INTRODUCTION
In 2005, near the peak of the recent housing bubble, derivatives
traders at AIG were making money hand-over-fist by selling credit de-
fault swaps linked to subprime mortgages. This in itself is not surpris-
ing: AIG is an insurance company, and a credit default swap in essence
is an insurance policy on a bond or other debt obligation. What is
startling is that AIG at the same time was buying up mortgage-backed
securities for its own investment portfolio. This meant that the risks
borne by the company were correlated: its assets were likely to plunge
in value just as deep liability on its swaps was triggered. When the
housing market collapsed, the combined damage to both sides of AIG's
balance sheet was more than enough to sink the company.
This Article explains why seemingly reckless conduct of this type
can in fact be fully rational from the perspective of shareholders. Such
* Associate Professor, Fordham Law School. For helpful comments and conversations, I am
grateful to Michele Destefano Beardslee, Margaret Blair, Susan Block-Lieb, Emily L. Cauble,
Elizabeth F. Emens, Jill E. Fisch, George S. Geis, Sean J. Griffith, Jesse Grunfeld, Henry Hans-
mann, Rich Hynes, Stacey Iis, Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Jody S. Kraus, Paul G. Mahoney, Edward
R. Morrison, Richard A. Posner, Larry E. Ribstein, Amanda M. Rose, Josh Singer, Steve Thel,
Randall S. Thomas, and Ben Walther. Sue Zhou provided excellent research assistance. Any er-
rors are my own.
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conduct reflects an opportunism hazard presented by contingent debt,
a hazard that is here termed correlation-seeking. If a firm's contingent
debts are especially likely to be triggered when the firm is insolvent,
the debt contracts transfer value from the firm's unsecured creditors to
its shareholders. This transfer creates an incentive for a firm's manag-
ers to sell contingent claims against their firm that correlate - or that
through asset purchases can be made to correlate - with the firm's
insolvency risk. The result is an overuse of contingent debt that pro-
duces a variety of social costs such as overinvestment, higher borrow-
ing costs, and possible systemic risk. The potential loss of social
wealth is vast given the widespread modern use of contingent debt
contracts, which include derivatives such as credit default swaps
and options, as well as more traditional arrangements such as loan
guarantees.
Correlation-seeking is especially pernicious because, unlike other
types of shareholder opportunism, it does not force shareholders to
bear more risk in order to capture higher returns. To the contrary, eq-
uity volatility typically falls when the correlation between the firm's
contingent debt risk and insolvency risk rises. Correlation-seeking re-
duces the volatility of a firm's equity value because it makes it less
likely that the firm's contingent debt will be triggered when the equity
has any value. This inverse relationship between risk and return
marks a stark contrast with asset substitution, a form of shareholder
opportunism in which a firm borrows against safe assets but then ex-
changes them for riskier assets before the debt comes due. Asset subs-
titution makes equity returns more variable, meaning that sharehold-
ers must bear more risk to capture higher returns. And the same is
true when a firm transfers value from its creditors to its shareholders
by increasing its ratio of debt to equity, or its "leverage." Correlation-
seeking thus avoids a risk-return tradeoff that tends to make other
forms of shareholder opportunism self-limiting.
Conduct that is consistent with correlation-seeking played a key
role in the 2oo8 financial crisis. Such conduct is evident not only in
the pre-crisis years at AIG, but also at the government-sponsored
mortgage companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Both Fannie and
Freddie incurred deep contingent debts, in the form of guarantees on
mortgage assets, that were highly likely to be triggered en masse under
conditions when their shareholders would already be wiped out. Con-
ventional accounts attribute risk-taking in these three firms to mere
recklessness, or to schemes by managers to expropriate wealth from
shareholders. But the fact that the companies incurred correlated as-
set and contingent debt risks suggests that their managers instead were
trying to enrich shareholders at the expense of creditors - or, as it
turned out, taxpayers. Although the correlated risks ultimately mate-
rialized, driving the firms insolvent, it does not follow that the manag-
ers' decisions were contrary to shareholder interests at the time they
2010] 1153
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were made. But those decisions did ensure that insolvency, if it came,
would be severe, which is why AIG, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac
were the three firms that received by far the biggest bailouts.
Despite the potential scope of the correlation-seeking hazard, nei-
ther lawmakers nor commentators have recognized the central role of
correlation in the economics of contingent debt. Legal doctrines meant
to protect creditors rely instead on principles designed for "fixed" debt
- a term used here to mean debt that is certain to come due on a spe-
cified future date. Accordingly, a contingent debt is treated as less of
an opportunism hazard because it is (by definition) less likely than a
fixed debt to come due. On this view, a contingent debt is like a fixed
debt, only less so.
There are at least two basic problems with this standard view of
contingent debt. The first is that, counterintuitively, a contingent debt
contract can capture significantly more wealth from a firm's unsecured
creditors than would a fixed debt contract with the same face value.
This is because a firm that incurs a $ioo fixed debt (such as by taking
out a simple loan) typically receives close to $ioo in new assets (the
loan proceeds) in exchange. And those new assets mostly neutralize
the debt's dilutive effect on the firm's unsecured creditors. But when
a firm incurs a $ioo debt that has, for example, only a io% chance of
coming due, the firm receives in exchange new assets worth no more
than $io. And if this contingent debt is especially likely to be trig-
gered when the firm is insolvent, the disparity between the new as-
sets and the debt's $ioo face value greatly reduces expected creditor
recoveries.
A second problem with legal doctrines that fail to distinguish be-
tween fixed and contingent debt is that the opportunism mechanisms
are different for each. What matters most with fixed debt is its total
face value relative to the firm's equity value: the higher this ratio, the
greater the degree to which losses are borne by the firm's creditors ra-
ther than its shareholders. By contrast, a contract that creates a con-
tingent debt with even a relatively large face value (or, in the language
of derivatives, "notional" amount) can either benefit or harm a firm's
unsecured creditors, depending on whether the correlation between the
contingency risk and the firm's insolvency risk is negative or positive.
For this reason, legal measures that consider only a debt's face value,
and ignore correlations, often produce results that are wholly unrelated
to the actual opportunism hazard.
A failure to recognize the pivotal role of correlation in the econom-
ics of contingent debt is a major shortcoming of the Obama Adminis-
tration's proposed regulations for derivative contracts. Those propos-
als rely on standard measures for regulating fixed debt, such as higher
capital and collateral requirements. If implemented, the proposals
would raise costs for all derivative users, but would not block the spe-
1154 [VOL. 123:ii151
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cific type of opportunism that creates the risk of another AIG, Fannie
Mae, or Freddie Mac-style collapse in the future.
The correlation-seeking hazard also calls into question the adminis-
tration's philosophy on executive compensation. In the wake of the
financial crisis, the Treasury Department has required senior managers
at bailout recipients to take more of their pay in the form of company
stock rather than cash. And the Federal Reserve has issued guidelines
suggesting that it is considering similar executive pay rules for banks.
This emphasis on equity compensation implies that the administration
is concerned primarily with conflicts of interest between managers and
long-term shareholders. But at least at the biggest bailout recipients,
the evidence suggests that the more serious problem was conflict be-
tween the interests of creditors on the one hand, and the interests of
shareholders, as advanced by managers, on the other. And the admin-
istration's pay approach, by further aligning manager and shareholder
interests, only exacerbates this conflict.
These observations indicate that legal rules for contingent debt
should be fundamentally rethought. For example, Congress should
consider repealing special Bankruptcy Code exemptions that give de-
rivative counterparties priority over other unsecured creditors. Those
exemptions undermine the counterparties' incentive to monitor in or-
der to prevent forms of shareholder opportunism such as correlation-
seeking, even though the counterparties' sophistication would make
them better monitors than most other creditors. In addition, pay rules
at systemically important firms should be set to protect creditors as
well as shareholders. Finally, fraudulent transfer law should be re-
formed to permit courts to subordinate a contingent debt if a high cor-
relation between the contingency risk and the debtor's insolvency risk
was apparent at the time of contracting. Such a rule would nullify the
wealth transfer away from the debtor's unsecured creditors, thereby
reducing the incentive for shareholders to use such debts to expro-
priate wealth rather than create wealth.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the economics
of correlation-seeking. Part II shows how correlation-seeking explains
risk-taking conduct at AIG, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac in the years
leading up to the 2008 financial crisis. And Part Ill considers how
lawmakers could redesign key legal doctrines to target the distinct op-
portunism hazard that contingent debt presents.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF CORRELATION-SEEKING
This Part analyzes the economics of contingent debt opportunism.
Section A explains why a positive correlation between the risk that a
firm will fall insolvent and the risk that its contingent liabilities will be
triggered enriches the firm's shareholders at the expense of its unse-
cured creditors. Section B uses a simple numerical model to demon-
2010] 1155
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strate why lawmakers' emphasis on fixed debt may be misplaced, and
in particular why a contingent debt is a bigger opportunism hazard
than a fixed debt of comparable size. Section C explains that correla-
tion-seeking is especially pernicious because, unlike the forms of
shareholder opportunism previously studied by scholars, it often re-
duces the level of risk borne by shareholders even as it increases
shareholder returns. And section D explains why correlation-seeking
generates various costs that destroy social wealth.
A. How Correlation Determines the Impact of a Contingent Debt
A debt is contingent if it becomes payable only upon the occurrence
of an uncertain future event, known as the triggering event. A wide
variety of financial contracts create contingent debts, including guar-
antees, options, and credit default swaps. In each case, the debtor (the
firm liable if the contingency occurs) receives one or more up-front
payments, known collectively as the premium. In exchange, the debtor
agrees to pay the claimant (the other party to the contract) a specified
amount - known as the contract's face value - if the triggering event
comes to pass. For example, if the arrangement is a guarantee on a
loan, the triggering event is the failure of a third party to repay a debt
to the claimant. If the contract is a put option, the triggering event is
the decline of a stock price below the option's strike price. And for a
credit default swap, the triggering event is the nonperformance of a
debt-like instrument such as a corporate bond or mortgage-backed
security.
Contingent debts can serve socially valuable purposes. Many con-
tingent debt contracts act as insurance policies on investments, and in
that role they can be value-creating if the debtor is better positioned
than the claimant to bear the downside risk on the investment. This
may be true if, for example, the debtor can diversify risk more cheaply
than the claimant can.
Contingent debt contracts can, however, serve a less benign func-
tion: to enrich the shareholders of the debtor at the expense of the deb-
tor's unsecured creditors. To see how this could occur, imagine a hy-
pothetical contingent debt contract which provides that the debtor will
be obligated to make a payment to the claimant if and only if the deb-
tor falls insolvent. Under such an arrangement, the debtor's share-
holders enjoy the benefits but bear none of the risk. If the debtor re-
mains solvent, the contract expires without the debt's being triggered,
and the shareholders' equity stake is enhanced by the amount of the
premium. And if the debtor falls insolvent, the triggering of the con-
tingent debt makes no difference to the shareholders, whose equity
stake is wiped out anyway. Rather, the triggered liability is borne
1156 [VOL. 123:1151
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by the debtor's unsecured creditors, because it dilutes their recoveries
from the debtor's bankrupt estate.1 In other words, such a contract
constructs a perfect "heads we win, tails you lose" relationship between
the debtor's shareholders and unsecured creditors.
Would it make sense for someone to buy a contingent claim that
could be asserted only against an insolvent debtor? The answer, of
course, is yes - if the price is right. The fact that a debtor is insolvent
does not mean that its debts are worthless. Rather, each creditor -
including each contingent debt claimant - will be entitled to a portion
of the bankrupt debtor's assets, with each portion determined by va-
riables such as the size of the creditor's claim and whether the claim is
secured. Therefore, as long as the premium on the contingent debt
contract is adjusted to reflect the debtor's insolvency risk, a mutually
profitable deal can be struck. And in the hypothetical contract just
described - in which the debt is triggered by the debtor's insolvency
- there would be a wide range of premiums acceptable to both debtor
and claimant. That contract in effect is a sale of a piece of the deb-
tor's future bankrupt estate, a piece that would otherwise go to the
debtor's general creditors. The claimant would be willing to pay any
amount up to her expected recovery if the triggering event occurs, dis-
counted by the triggering event's probability. And the debtor's share-
holders would be willing to accept any premium greater than zero, be-
cause they bear no downside risk on the contract at all.
In reality, a court would likely refuse to enforce a contract that ex-
plicitly required a firm to make a payment only if the firm fell insol-
vent.' However, the argument in this Article is that firms can - and
often do - achieve an economically equivalent result by engaging in
correlation-seeking. That is, firms can incur contingent debt that cor-
relates, or that through asset purchases can be made to correlate, with
I For a firm's unsecured creditors to bear the full brunt of a contingent debt that is triggered
when the firm is insolvent, the firm's equity investors must enjoy limited liability, which is why
those investors are referred to here as "shareholders," implying a corporation. But limited liability
is a feature of most of the other widely used modern business entities, including the limited liabili-
ty company, limited liability partnership, and Delaware statutory trust. See Henry Hansmann,
Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, ii9 HARV. L. REV. 1333,
1397 (2oo6). Only the common law partnership continues to hold equity investors fully liable for
firm debts.
2 One possibility is that a court would deem this hypothetical contract an improper "ipso fac-
to" arrangement. Provisions of the Bankruptcy Code deny enforcement of ipso facto clauses in
specific contexts. See i I U.S.C. § 365(e)(i)(A) (2006) (executory contracts); id. § 541(c)(i)(B) (deb-
tor interests in property). And several courts have drawn from these provisions and from legisla-
tive history a principle that ipso facto clauses generally are against public policy. See Michael J.
Di Gennaro & Harley J. Goldstein, Can Ipso Facto Clauses Resolve the Discharge Debate?: An
Economic Approach to Novated Fraud Debt in Bankruptcy, i DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 417,
443 (2003) (collecting cases). Alternatively, a court might deem the contract a deliberate fraudu-
lent transfer. See I I U.S.C. § 548(a)(I)(A) (empowering bankruptcy trustees to invalidate obliga-
tions incurred "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors).
2010] ,157
HeinOnline  -- 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1157 2009-2010
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
their insolvency risk. And except in the extreme case of a contract
that expressly defines the triggering event as the debtor's insolvency,
there is little that prohibits correlation-seeking under current law.
Correlation-seeking can take two general forms. The first, which
might be called the "forward" type, occurs when a firm's managers sell
a contingent claim against the firm that would be triggered only in cir-
cumstances when the firm would likely be insolvent. An example
would be when a parent corporation issues a guarantee on a loan tak-
en out by its subsidiary. If the parent's largest asset is its equity stake
in the subsidiary, the insolvency of the subsidiary would probably
cause the parent to fail as well. Therefore, the guarantee on the sub-
sidiary's loan creates a contingent liability that the parent's sharehold-
ers, as contrasted with its unsecured creditors, will almost never have
to bear. And the second, or "reverse," type of correlation-seeking oc-
curs when a firm incurs contingent debt and then purchases assets that
are especially likely to lose value at the same time the debt is triggered.
A dramatic recent example is provided by AIG, which incurred large
contingent liabilities by selling credit default swaps on subprime mort-
gage-backed securities, and then bought up subprime securities for its
own investment portfolio. These asset purchases made it likely that
AIG would be insolvent if liability on its credit default swaps was ever
triggered.
Regardless of whether correlation-seeking is of the forward or re-
verse type, the result is the same: a value transfer from the debtor's
unsecured creditors to its shareholders. The transfer occurs when the
contingent debt is incurred, or - in the case of reverse correlation-
seeking - when the firm purchases the correlated assets. And it con-
sists of a decrease in the creditors' expected recoveries and a corres-
ponding increase in the value of shareholder equity. Though rational
from the perspective of shareholders, correlation-seeking will often be
wealth-destroying from a social perspective. This is because the op-
portunity for shareholders to expropriate wealth from creditors distorts
a firm's borrowing and investment decisions, leading to overinvest-
ment, higher borrowing costs, financial distress, and potential systemic
risk.
Why have lawmakers overlooked the distinct opportunism hazard
raised by contingent debt? The answer, it seems, is they have assumed
that creditors are protected by the fact that the debtor typically rece-
ives a premium when it voluntarily incurs a contingent debt obliga-
tion. This assumption is implicit in fraudulent transfer doctrine,
which (except in the case of intentional fraud) empowers a court to de-
ny payment on a contingent debt only if the debtor did not receive a
[VOL. 123:1151
HeinOnline  -- 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1158 2009-2010
SHAREHOLDER OPPORTUNISM
premium that approximates the debt's expected value to the claimant.3
Because the premium becomes part of the debtor's pool of assets, it
augments creditor recoveries if the debtor falls insolvent. Thus, the
theory seems to go, the premium protects the unsecured creditors by
offsetting the dilutive effect of the contingent debt on their recoveries.
The problem with this theory is that it ignores the pivotal role of
the correlation between the risk that the debt will be triggered and the
risk that the debtor will fall insolvent. As shorthand, this will be
called the contingent debt's "internal" correlation. To understand the
importance of the internal correlation, it is necessary to observe that
the premium paid for a contingent debt will be smaller - usually,
many times smaller - than the debt's face value. For example, if the
debt's face value is $ioo, and its probability of coming due is io%, a
rational claimant will pay a premium no greater than $1o. 4 It follows
that such a contract will impose a large expected loss on the debtor's
unsecured creditors unless they are far more likely to recover the pre-
mium than to bear the impact of the debt. As was noted previously,
the creditors will pocket the premium when the debtor falls insolvent,
because then the premium will augment their recoveries from the deb-
tor's estate. The question therefore becomes, when the debtor does fall
insolvent, what is the likelihood that the contingent debt will also be
triggered? The internal correlation answers this question. If, to use
the same numerical example, the internal correlation is zero, then by
definition the contingent debt will be triggered in only io% of the in-
stances when the debtor falls insolvent. Therefore, at an internal cor-
relation of zero the unsecured creditors are ten times more likely to re-
cover the premium than to bear the impact of the liability. And this
ratio mostly neutralizes, in terms of the creditors' expected recoveries,
the fact that the debt's face value is at least ten times larger than the
premium. However, as the internal correlation increases, the tables
turn against the unsecured creditors. And at a perfect correlation -
meaning that the contingent debt is triggered if and only if the debtor
falls insolvent - the creditors pocket the premium only when they al-
so bear the full brunt of the liability. In that case, the disparity be-
tween the premium and the face value imposes a large expected loss
on them.
The relationship between the internal correlation and the fortunes
of the unsecured creditors is depicted in the following figure, which
conceptualizes a contingent debt contract as having four possible
outcomes.
3 See iI U.S.C. § 548(a)(I)(BXi). The application of fraudulent transfer doctrine to contingent
debt is discussed in section Ill.B.
4 The claimant will actually pay something less than $io due to the time value of money and
her expectation that she will not to be paid in full if her claim is triggered.
2010] 1159
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FIGURE i. THE IMPACT OF A CONTINGENT DEBT CONTRACT
ON CREDITORS AND SHAREHOLDERS
CONTINGENT DEBT
DEBTOR Not Triggered Triggered
Unsecured Creditors Indifferent: Unsecured Creditors Indifferent:
full repayment full repayment
Solvent
Shareholders Benefited: Shareholders Harmed:
premium augments equity contingent debt reduces equity
Unsecured Creditors Benefited: Unsecured Creditors Harmed:
premium augments recoveries contingent debt dilutes recoveries
Insolvent
Shareholders Indifferent: Shareholders Indifferent:
equity stake wiped out equity stake wiped out
Note: Shading indicates outcomes that are more likely with a positive cor-
relation between the contingency risk and the insolvency risk. No shading
indicates outcomes that are more likely with a negative correlation.
Figure I shows why a positive internal correlation harms the deb-
tor's unsecured creditors. Consider each of the four outcomes from
their perspective. They are indifferent to the contingent debt contract
in the two outcomes where the debtor remains solvent, because in
those outcomes the debtor by definition can pay their claims in full re-
gardless of whether the debt is triggered. The contract benefits them
in the outcome (insolvent, not triggered), because the premium increas-
es the pool of available assets, and the creditors do not have to share
those assets with the claimant. By definition, this outcome is more
likely when the internal correlation is negative. Finally, the net effect
of the contract is to harm the unsecured creditors in the outcome (in-
solvent, triggered). This is because of the face-value/premium dispari-
ty described earlier: the fact that, when the contingent debt is trig-
gered, the claimant asserts a claim significantly larger than the amount
she previously contributed to the debtor's assets. And this outcome is
more likely when the internal correlation is positive.
Matters are almost exactly reversed from the perspective of the
debtor's shareholders, as Figure i also indicates. Thus, the sharehold-
ers are indifferent to the contingent debt contract if a decline in the
value of the debtor's assets causes the debtor to fall insolvent, because
116o [Vol. 12 3:115 1
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then by definition the shareholders' equity stake is wiped out regard-
less of whether the debt is triggered.5 If the debtor remains solvent,
the shareholders naturally prefer that the debt not be triggered, be-
cause then their equity stake is augmented by the premium and not
reduced by the amount of the debt. This outcome is more likely when
the internal correlation is positive. Finally, the contract harms the
shareholders in the outcome (solvent, triggered), again because of the
face-value/premium disparity. And this outcome is more likely when
the internal correlation is negative. In short, the contingent debt con-
tract tends to enrich the shareholders when the internal correlation is
positive and to harm them when negative, the mirror image of its im-
pact on the unsecured creditors. To the extent that the debtor's man-
agers are loyal to the shareholders, we can expect them to select the
debtor's contingent debts accordingly.
Besides forcing them to shoulder more risk, a positive internal cor-
relation can harm the unsecured creditors in a second way: it can
shrink the premium. By definition, the claimant collects on the con-
tingent debt only in the two outcomes in which the debt is triggered.
Between these, she prefers the outcome in which the debtor is solvent
and hence can pay her claim in full. This outcome is more likely when
the internal correlation is negative. If instead the claim is triggered
when the debtor is insolvent, the claimant recovers only a portion of
her claim if she is unsecured, and she also recovers only a portion if
she is secured but the secured assets have depreciated to less than her
claim's face value. And this outcome is more likely when the internal
correlation is positive. It follows that an increase in the "perceived"
internal correlation - meaning the internal correlation that is evident
to the claimant at the time of contracting - reduces the claimant's
willingness to pay. And a reduction in the premium harms the unse-
cured creditors by shrinking the pool of assets available to them in the
debtor's bankruptcy proceeding. A positive internal correlation thus
can land a one-two punch on the unsecured creditors: it increases the
likelihood that, if the debtor falls insolvent, they will have to share the
debtor's assets with the claimant; and it can decrease the value of
those assets by causing the claimant to pay a smaller premium.
As this last observation suggests, firms often receive the smallest
premiums in exchange for precisely those contingent debts that are
most likely to be borne by the firms' unsecured creditors rather than
shareholders. Does this mean that the incentive for firms to engage in
forward correlation-seeking is somehow self-correcting? The answer,
5 The implicit assumption here is that the contingent debt is not large enough itself to cause
the debtor's insolvency, which therefore must arise from an independent source, such as a busi-
ness downturn that diminishes the value of the debtor's assets. The alternative possibility - a
contingent debt big enough to cause insolvency by itself - is addressed in section I.B.2.
11612010]
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alas, is no. To see why, consider that the premium paid for a contin-
gent debt can be divided into two pieces: one representing the clai-
mant's expected recovery if the debtor stays solvent, and the other
representing her expected recovery if the debtor falls insolvent. Only
the second piece induces opportunism, because only it pays sharehold-
ers for risk borne by others. As the perceived correlation increases, the
first piece shrinks, but the second piece grows. To be sure, the net ef-
fect of a higher correlation is a smaller premium, because the claimant
expects to collect more from a solvent debtor than an insolvent one.
But the opportunism hazard nonetheless rises with the correlation level
because the premium increasingly overcompensates the shareholders
relative to the risk they bear.
Why would a firm's unsecured creditors permit its managers to en-
gage in correlation-seeking? While opportunism of this type is not il-
legal as a matter of positive law, creditors (other than involuntary tort
victims) in theory could negotiate loan covenants that prohibit it. As a
practical matter, however, this approach will often not be cost-
effective. Loan covenants will deter opportunism only if the creditors
monitor the debtor for violations, as opportunism will otherwise be
evident only after the debtor has fallen insolvent, at which point an
enforcement action will be ineffective because the debtor will be
judgment-proof. And for many creditors, especially those with rela-
tively small claims, the necessary monitoring costs will exceed the ex-
pected losses that the monitoring would prevent. 6 Along these lines,
Professors Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock have observed that bond
covenants designed to deter debtor opportunism are regularly underen-
forced because monitoring costs for individual bondholders are high
and bondholders face collective action problems.7 The fact that law-
makers have developed a variety of noncontractual measures to pro-
tect creditors - such as fraudulent transfer law, voidable preference
rules, and the bankruptcy system itself - attests to contract law's lim-
itations in deterring debtor opportunism. Thus, rather than monitor,
many creditors will simply impute opportunism risk into the interest
rate they demand up front from all debtors, a response that does not
deter opportunism because the debtor pays the same interest rate re-
6 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 1O5 YALE L.J. 857, 864 (1996) (describing why many creditors do not pro-
tect themselves from the risk that their debtor will use a secured loan to subordinate their claims);
Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical In-
tervention, 118 HARv. L. REV. 1197, 1226 (2005) (arguing that many creditors are unlikely to find
it cost-effective to enforce protective loan covenants).
7 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Fund Activism in the Enforcement of Bond-
holder Rights, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 296-3oi (2009). The authors argue that activist hedge
funds can overcome the underenforcement problem, id. at 301-02, but they note that incentive-
based obstacles remain, id. at 309.
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gardless of how it treats its creditors after it borrows.8 An across-the-
board increase in interest rates will, however, decrease social wealth by
acting like a tax on credit, a point that will be revisited in the discus-
sion of the social costs of correlation-seeking in section I.D.
Finally, creditors will not bother to monitor if they believe that the
government will bail them out if their debtor fails. Bailouts shift the
loss produced by correlation-seeking from the debtor's unsecured cred-
itors to another group of "creditors": taxpayers. And the correlation-
seeking hazard will be at its zenith when creditors lack incentive to
monitor, an observation of obvious importance as lawmakers continue
to craft a response to the 2008 financial crisis.
B. The Scale of the Hazard: Contingent Versus Fixed Debt
The discussion to this point explains why correlation-seeking is an
opportunism hazard. But is it a hazard big enough to worry about?
Legal rules designed to prevent misuse of debt imply that the answer is
no. Those rules ignore correlations, and apply to contingent debts the
same principles they use to prevent abuse of fixed debts such as loans
and bond obligations. 9
Is this lack of nuance justified? The answer might be yes if contin-
gent debts produced smaller opportunistic wealth transfers than fixed
debts of comparable size, and thus did not merit special attention. On
an intuitive level this notion has some appeal: a claim that is ioo%
likely to come due - which is another way to describe a fixed debt -
seems a much bigger dilution threat to the debtor's unsecured creditors
than a claim for the same face value that is only (say) io% likely to
come due. Some version of this notion seems to underlie standard ac-
counting rules, which require a firm to accrue a loss if a liability is cer-
tain or "probable,"'10 but permit liabilities that are only a "reasonable
possibility" to be consigned to footnotes." And "remote" contingencies
often need not be disclosed at all.' 2
The law's general failure to distinguish between contingent and
fixed debt might also be justified if the same factors determined
8 See Richard Squire, The Case for Symmetry in Creditors' Rights, 1i8 YALE L.J. 8o6, 840-41
(2009) (making the same point with respect to the secured loan).
9 Two sets of such rules are discussed in Part III.
10 ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 5,
para. 8 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1975).
1 Id. para. io.
12 An exception applies to guarantees, which the Financial Accounting Standards Board has
decided should be disclosed even if the contingency risk is remote. Id. para. 12; see also
GUARANTOR'S ACCOUNTING AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR GUARANTEES, IN-
CLUDING INDIRECT GUARANTEES OF INDEBTEDNESS OF OTHERS, Interpretation No. 45
(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2002) (elaborating on accrual and disclosure requirements for
guarantees).
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whether a debt of either type was an opportunism hazard, permitting a
one-size-fits-all legal approach. With a fixed debt, we know that the
hazard is driven by the face value: the larger this amount, the greater
the increase in the debtor's ratio of debt to equity, or leverage. And
higher leverage increases the degree to which creditors rather than
shareholders suffer losses caused by a drop in the value of the firm's
assets.' 3 Unless the creditors can force the firm to compensate them
for these greater expected losses by charging higher interest rates, they
suffer a wealth transfer to the benefit of shareholders. 14 Current legal
doctrine might make sense if misuse of contingent debt worked by the
same mechanism, with the hazard driven primarily by the contingent
debt's face value (or, in the language of derivatives, "notional"
amount).
In fact, neither of these potential justifications for current legal
doctrine is valid. This section uses a simple model of a contingent
debt contract to show why. The model demonstrates that a contingent
debt can in fact transfer more wealth than a fixed debt for the same
face amount, even if the contingent debt is far less likely to be trig-
gered. And the model also shows that the opportunism hazard is de-
termined not only by the contingent debt's face value, but also by its
internal correlation. Indeed, even a relatively large contingent debt
can be pernicious or benign, depending on whether the internal corre-
lation is positive or negative. For this reason, rules for contingent
debt that ignore correlations and consider only face values will often
produce results that bear no relationship to the actual opportunism
hazard.
The model employed in this section also yields another important
result: it shows that the internal correlation does not have to be un-
usually high for a contingent debt to harm the debtor's unsecured
creditors. To the contrary, any nonnegative correlation will typically
be sufficient to reduce their expected recoveries. For this reason, the
correlation-seeking hazard cannot be disregarded on grounds that
some firms might find it difficult to arrange for contingent debts with
unusually high internal correlations.
The model will address two general cases. In the first, the contin-
gent debt is not large enough in itself to render the debtor insolvent.
Under that assumption, the debtor falls insolvent only if it suffers a
business downturn that causes its assets to depreciate below the
amount of its fixed liabilities. The second case addresses the alterna-
tive possibility, in which the contingent debt is big enough to break the
13 See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Pro-
tection or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 931, 94o-41 (1993); Yedidia Z. Stern, A
General Model for Corporate Acquisition Law, 26 J. CORP. L. 675, 706-08 (2ooI).
14 Squire, supra note 8, at 819-20.
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debtor even if the debtor's assets do not also decline in value. In other
words, in the second case the contingent debt is itself a source of inter-
nal correlation. As one might expect, the opportunism hazard is great-
er in the second case than the first. But in either case the contingent
debt has the capacity, even at relatively low correlations, to transfer
more wealth than a fixed debt of equal size.
i. Contingent Debt Not Larger than the Debtor's Equity Value. -
Suppose that Debtor is a business corporation owned and controlled
by Shareholders. Debtor initially has $125 in assets and one liability, a
$ioo fixed debt to Unsecured Creditor.'5 The model plays out over
two periods. In period one, Debtor enters into a contract with Clai-
mant that creates a contingent debt. Under the contract, Claimant
pays Debtor a premium in period one, and Debtor agrees to pay Clai-
mant $25 if a specified triggering event occurs in period two. Because
Debtor's managers are skilled negotiators, Claimant pays a premium
equal to her expected recovery on the contract, which is the largest
premium a risk-neutral party in Claimant's position rationally would
pay. 1 6 In period two, Debtor experiences two types of risk. The first is
that the triggering event will occur. We will assume that the probabili-
ty of this event is io%. The second is that Debtor will suffer a busi-
ness downturn that causes its assets - including the premium, which
has become part of Debtor's property - to lose 40% of their value.
We will assume that the probability of a downturn is also io%.17 At
the end of period two, the debt to Unsecured Creditor comes due and
the payouts for the parties are determined.
15 These figures make for a leverage ratio of 4:1, a conservative level that permits analysis of a
contingent debt that is relatively large but not big enough in itself to cause insolvency. Higher
leverage increases the likelihood that the contingent debt will be sufficient to cause insolvency, a
possibility addressed in section I.B.2.
16 In theory, a contingent debt contract might generate efficiencies that benefit the claimant,
and the debtor might be able to capture the value of those efficiencies in the premium. The most
obvious efficiency - assuming the claimant is risk-averse - would be to smooth out returns on
the claimant's investment portfolio. However, the model already imputes such a benefit by as-
suming that Claimant does not apply a risk-based discount when valuating her uncertain recov-
ery on the contract. A second possibility would be that the contract induces the debtor to try to
prevent the triggering event, such as by monitoring the "reference" entity. This potential benefit is
perhaps most likely with certain types of guarantee.
17 In the world of corporate debt this would make Debtor a high credit risk; the discussion
later considers the implications if Debtor were safer. Also, setting the downturn risk equal to the
contingency risk permits analysis of the full range of positive internal correlations. For example,
if Debtor's downturn risk were lo% but the contingency risk were only 5%, then the highest poss-
ible internal correlation would be 0.69. See infra note 20.
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Note that this model has four possible outcomes, corresponding to
the four outcomes depicted in Figure i.18 Note too that a downturn
will render Debtor insolvent but the triggering of the contingent debt
by itself will not, because the debt's face value ($25) is not larger than
Debtor's starting equity value (also $25).
Based on these assumptions, it is possible to calculate Unsecured
Creditor's "baseline loss," by which is meant the difference between
the $ioo face value of Unsecured Creditor's claim and the amount Un-
secured Creditor would expect to recover if there were no contract be-
tween Debtor and Claimant. 19 In the analysis that follows, Unsecured
Creditor's baseline loss is used to place the impact of opportunism in
the context of the other main risk a creditor faces: the risk of a down-
turn that renders the debtor insolvent.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the internal correlation on
the contingent debt and the impact of the debt contract on Unsecured
Creditor.
18 This simple model can be formalized with the following terms, which will be used for all
formulae in this Article:
A: initial value of Debtor's assets
U: amount Debtor owes Unsecured Creditor
C: face value of debt to Claimant
V: Debtor's total liabilities after contract is signed, or U + C
d: discount factor (between o and i) used to determine value of Debtor's assets in down-
turn
p(R):probability that contingent debt is triggered
p(D):probability that Debtor suffers an asset downturn.
19 The baseline loss equals the difference between the face amount of Unsecured Creditor's
claim and his expected recovery if there is no contract with Claimant, and hence the only risk he
faces is the downturn risk. In general terms, it can be expressed as:
B = U-[p(not D)*U + p(D)*dA].
Because p(not D) equals i - p(D), this formula simplifies to:
(1) B = p(D)*[U- dA].
Under the numerical assumptions specified above, the baseline loss is $2.50.
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FIGURE 2. CONTINGENT VERSUS FIXED DEBT
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Note: contingency and downturn risks are io% each
Figure 2'S x-axis represents the internal correlation on the contingent
debt, which is determined by the relative probabilities of the model's
four outcomes.20 As the correlation increases, so does the probability
of the outcome in which the asset downturn and triggering event both
occur, as well as the probability of the outcome in which neither oc-
curs. By necessity, this means that an increase in the correlation cor-
responds to a decrease in the probabilities of the two outcomes where
one of these risks materializes but the other does not. 21 The y-axis
20 The x-axis represents the correlation coefficient for the relationship between the risk of the
triggering event and the risk that Debtor will fall insolvent for each possible distribution of prob-
abilities across the model's four outcomes, as represented in Figure i. Its formula is:
(2) p,,. =E((X-X)(Y-p,))/orq.
E is expected value, # is mean value, a is standard deviation, and X and Y are a pair of dummy
variables. X is o when the triggering event does not occur and i when it does. Y is o when insol-
vency does not occur and i when it does. Due to the assumption that each risk has a io% proba-
bility, /4 and /4 are both o.i, and or, and or, are both 0.3. Note that /4 by definition equals p(R),
and /4 equals p(D) if we assume (as we do in Figure 2) that Debtor is insolvent only if a down-
turn occurs. A discrete expected value for the product of the differences between each dummy
variable and its mean - that is, a discrete covariance for X and Y - can be obtained for each
possible distribution of probabilities across the model's four outcomes, producing a one-to-one
correspondence between each possible probability distribution and each correlation coefficient
represented along Figure 2's x-axis.
21 In terms of Figure i, a higher internal correlation means higher probabilities of the out-
comes (insolvent, triggered) and (solvent, not triggered), and lower probabilities of the outcomes
(insolvent, not triggered) and (solvent, triggered).
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represents the value transfer away from Unsecured Creditor.22  The
transfer is defined as the decrease in Unsecured Creditor's expected
recovery caused by the contract between Debtor and Claimant, and is
expressed in the figure as a percentage of Unsecured Creditor's base-
line loss. The diagonal line shows the transfer produced by the con-
tingent debt contract at each possible internal correlation level.2 3
As predicted, the internal correlation drives the contingent debt
contract's expected impact. When the internal correlation is -o.i (its
lowest possible value given the assumptions used for Figure 224), the
contract confers a windfall on Unsecured Creditor, reducing his ex-
pected losses by 6%.21 When the contingency and insolvency risks are
uncorrelated, the contract has essentially no expected impact on Unse-
cured Creditor, increasing his expected losses by a trivial 0.3%. Final-
ly, when the internal correlation is perfect (I.O), the contract imposes a
large burden on Unsecured Creditor, taking enough value from him to
increase his expected losses by 57%.26 This range of results shows that
a contingent debt's face value is not the only factor that drives the op-
portunism hazard. Rather, it is the internal correlation that determines
whether the debt contract tends to enrich a debtor's unsecured credi-
22 The transfer is computed in two steps. First, the premium is calculated, which by assump-
tion equals Claimant's expected recovery on her contract with Debtor. Assuming that A > V and
that Claimant is unsecured, the formula for the premium is:
P = p(not DIR)*C + p(DIR)*[C/V]*d[A + P].
Solved for P, this equation becomes:
(3) P = [p(not DIR)*CV + p(DIR)*dA*C]/[V-p(DIR)*dC].
The wealth transfer away from Unsecured Creditor is defined as Unsecured Creditor's expected
recovery without the contract between Debtor and Claimant minus his expected recovery when
the contract is in place. It can be expressed as:
T = p(D)*dA - p(Dinot R)*d[A + P] - p(DIR)*d[A + P]*[U/V].
Because Unsecured Creditor's recovery is not affected by the contract when Debtor does not fall
insolvent, those outcomes are excluded from the equation. Because p(D) equals p(Dinot R) plus
p(DIR), the equation simplifies to:
(4) T = p(DIR)*d[A - (A + P)*(UI/V)]-p(Dlnot R)*dP.
23 The figure's diagonal line is created by plugging the outcome probabilities corresponding to
each correlation level into equations (3) and (4) in note 2 2, supra, and then dividing T by B as cal-
culated by equation (i) in note 19, supra. As described in note 20, supra, each value for the corre-
lation coefficient in Figure 2 corresponds to a discrete distribution of probabilities across the mod-
el's four possible outcomes.
24 A correlation coefficient of i.o means that only the outcomes (solvent, not triggered) and
(insolvent, triggered) can occur, with the probability of outcome (solvent, not triggered) being go%
and of outcome (insolvent, triggered) being io%. The opposite extreme, meaning a correlation
coefficient of -i.o, would require that only the outcomes (solvent, triggered) and (insolvent, not
triggered) could occur, which is impossible given the assumptions that the triggering event and the
asset downturn are each only lo% likely. Rather, the lowest possible correlation occurs when the
outcome (solvent, triggered) is io% probable, the outcome (insolvent, not triggered) is lo% proba-
ble, and the outcome (solvent, not triggered) is 8o% probable, which yields a correlation coeffi-
cient of -o.i
25 The nominal value of the transfer at this correlation level is $o.x5 .
26 In nominal terms, T is $1.43 when the internal correlation is perfect.
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tors, harm them, or - when the internal correlation is close to zero -
have little effect in either direction. 27
There is a flip side to the contract's impact on Unsecured Creditor
as shown in Figure 2, and that is its impact on Debtor's Shareholders.
Indeed, Shareholders' expected gains are almost exactly equal to Un-
secured Creditor's expected losses at each positive correlation level.
This parity of outcomes is a result of the assumption that Claimant
pays a premium equal to her expected recovery on the contract, which
includes the full amount she expects to recover at Unsecured Credi-
tor's expense. 28 For this reason, Figure 2 's diagonal line can be inter-
preted to represent the amount of value that the contingent debt con-
tract transfers from Unsecured Creditor to Shareholders at each
correlation level. If we were to assume instead that Claimant paid a
premium smaller than the contract's full expected value to her, Share-
holders would not capture the entire transfer away from Unsecured
Creditor, but rather they and Claimant would split it between them.
Figure 2 also has a dashed horizontal line, which shows the ex-
pected loss to Unsecured Creditor under the alternative assumption
that Debtor's $25 obligation to Claimant is fixed rather than contin-
gent - meaning that the "risk" of its being triggered is ioo%. Strictly
speaking, the internal correlation on a claim that is ioo% likely to
come due is indeterminate; the figure nonetheless depicts the result as
a horizontal line to permit comparison with the impact of an equally
sized contingent claim at each correlation level. As the figure indi-
cates, a $25 fixed debt contract increases Unsecured Creditor's ex-
27 The fact that an uncorrelated contingent debt produces only a trivial wealth transfer is ro-
bust to a broad range of numerical assumptions consistent with the model's four-outcome struc-
ture. By the four-outcome structure, what is meant are the parameters that Debtor starts out sol-
vent, an asset downturn renders Debtor insolvent, Claimant pays a premium equal to her
expected recovery on the contract, and - in this first case - the face value of the contingent debt
is not greater than Debtor's starting equity value. Thus, if we hold constant the assumption that
the amount owed Claimant is $25 and that the downturn and contingency risks are io% each, but
toggle all other variables, no combination of alternative assumptions that is consistent with these
parameters causes an uncorrelated contingent debt to transfer more than $o.o6.
28 Given the assumptions used in Figure 2, the formula for the increase in Debtor's expected
equity value attributable to the contract is:
G = p(not Dlnot R)*(A + P - U) + p(not DIR)*(A + P - V) - p(not D)*(A - U);
with P calculated using equation (3) in note 22, supra. Because by definition p(not D) equals
p(not Dlnot R) plus p(not DIR), the formula simplifies to:
(5) G = p(not Dlnot R)*P + p(not DIR)*(P - C).
For example, at a correlation of i.o, G equals $I.37, as contrasted with a T (per equation (4) in
note 22, supra) of $1.43. The $o.o6 difference between the gain to Shareholders and the loss to
Unsecured Creditor is attributable to the decline in value of the premium assets held by Debtor
when Debtor suffers a downturn.
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pected losses by 13%.29 This is the well-known effect of higher leve-
rage, which increases the degree to which creditors rather than share-
holders bear losses caused by a decline in the debtor's asset
value.30
Comparing the two lines in Figure 2 reveals that the contingent
debt contract has the capacity to transfer several times more value
away from Unsecured Creditor than the fixed debt contract, even
though the contingent debt is ten times less likely to come due. In-
deed, when the internal correlation is perfect, the transfer caused by
the contingent debt contract is more than four times as large. To be
sure, this particular ratio depends on the numerical assumptions used
in the model. 31 Nonetheless, across the full range of assumptions that
are consistent with the model's general, four-outcome structure,3 2 a
perfectly correlated contingent debt always harms Unsecured Creditor
more than a fixed debt with the same face value. And in almost all
situations it harms him by at least twice as much.33
The fact that a contingent debt can transfer significantly more
wealth than a fixed debt of equal size is counterintuitive, which may
help explain why lawmakers and scholars have paid little attention to
the distinct opportunism hazard that contingent debt presents. It
seems a matter of common sense that a $25 claim that will come due
with ioo% certainty is a much bigger dilution threat to the debtor's
unsecured creditors than a $25 claim that will come due only io% of
the time. And yet, as Figure 2 shows, the contingent debt will transfer
29 This result is calculated by using equations (3) and (4) in note 2 2, supra, and assuming that
p(not DIR) is 90% and p(DIR) is io%, making the probability of the triggering event ioo%. The
nominal amount of the transfer is $0.33.
30 See sources cited supra notes 13-14.
31 For example, the ratio between the wealth transfer amounts would fall from 4.3 to 3.7 if we
assumed that Debtor's assets lost go% of their value in a downturn rather than 40%. This is be-
cause a deeper devaluation destroys more Debtor wealth when the premium is larger, and a fixed
claim fetches a larger premium than a contingent claim. Thus, increasing the devaluation percen-
tage raises the relative dilutive effect of the fixed debt. The ratio would further drop to 2.5 if we
also assumed that Debtor's assets started out worth $I5o rather than $125. This occurs because a
fixed debt harms unsecured creditors primarily by increasing the debtor's debt-to-equity ratio,
and the impact would be relatively larger when the initial ratio is smaller. This ratio, however, is
completely insensitive to the debt's face value. If we were to use the other assumptions in Figure
2 but cut the face values of Claimant's fixed and contingent claims to $io each, or double them
both to $5o, the ratio would remain 4.3.
32 For an explanation of the model's general, four-outcome structure, see supra note 27.
33 The only way to get the wealth transfer ratio below 2.0 given the model's general structure
is to assume a much smaller initial value for the amount owed Unsecured Creditor, and thus an
unusually low leverage ratio. And this assumption, in turn, requires a further assumption that
Debtor's assets suffer a deeper devaluation in a downturn, for otherwise Debtor is not insolvent
when a downturn occurs. For example, if we assume that Unsecured Creditor is owed $5o rather
than $ioo, and a downturn causes Debtor's assets to depreciate 7o% rather than 40%, the wealth
transfer produced by a $25 contingent debt with a perfect internal correlation is only 1.6 times
greater than the transfer produced by a $25 fixed debt.
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more value - typically, several times more - as long as its internal
correlation is high enough.
The reason for this counterintuitive result is the face-
value/premium disparity described earlier. A rational party will be
willing to pay a relatively large up-front amount for a claim that is
ioo% likely to come due. For example, Claimant pays $24.29 for the
$25 fixed claim in Figure 2. This infusion of new assets into Debtor
largely (though, as the figure shows, not fully) neutralizes the fixed lia-
bility's dilutive impact on Unsecured Creditor. But no rational party
would similarly pay almost $25 for a $25 claim that only has a lO%
chance of becoming collectible. Rather, the premium Claimant pays
for the $25 contingent debt in Figure 2 ranges from $1.52 to $2.50,
with the premium shrinking as the correlation increases. When the
contingency and insolvency risks are uncorrelated, Unsecured Creditor
is ten times more likely to pocket this premium than to bear the bur-
den of the contingent liability, a ratio that mostly offsets, in terms of
his expected recovery, the fact that the face value is at least ten times
larger than the premium. But when the correlation is perfect, he bene-
fits from the premium only when he also bears the full brunt of the
liability, and therefore the disparity between the premium and the face
value imposes a large expected loss on him.
As this discussion implies, a contingent debt contract's relative ca-
pacity to harm unsecured creditors increases as the triggering event
becomes less likely, as long as the internal correlation remains high.
The reason is that a decrease in the probability of the triggering event
widens the disparity between the face value and the premium. For
example, if we were to assume in Figure 2 that the probabilities of the
asset downturn and the triggering event were each i% rather than
io%, and hence that Debtor were a better credit risk, the absolute
amounts of the wealth transfers would fall. But the ratio between the
loss caused by the perfectly correlated contingent debt and the loss
caused by the fixed debt would increase. 34 Conversely, the ratio would
shrink if the probabilities were 25% each,35 the predictable conse-
quence of the fact that a contingent debt looks more like a fixed debt
as the contingency becomes more likely.
Another important implication of Figure 2 is that the internal cor-
relation does not have to be unusually high for a contingent debt con-
tract to produce a larger value transfer than a fixed debt contract with
the same face value. The contingent debt in Figure 2 surpasses the
fixed debt as an opportunism hazard at a correlation level slightly
34 In particular, it would increase from 4.3 to 4.9.
35 It would fall to 3.4.
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above 0.2.36 By way of comparison, the average correlation between
returns on random pairings of publicly traded stocks is approximately
0.3 . 37 The implication is that whenever a debtor incurs a contingent
debt that is tied to the performance risk of another firm - such as by
writing a put option on that firm's stock - the debt contract already
captures as much value from the debtor's unsecured creditors as
would a fixed debt contract of comparable size. 38 If the debtor and
"reference" firm are in the same industry, the internal correlation will
be even larger,39 and so will the transfer. And the correlation and
transfer amounts will be greater still if the two entities are part of the
same firm, such as when one member of a corporate group guarantees
the debt of another.
2. Contingent Debt Big Enough To Cause Bankruptcy. - What
happens if the contingent debt is itself a source of internal correlation,
because it is large enough to bankrupt the debtor without an asset
downturn?4o
36 This result is robust to a wide range of available numerical assumptions. For example, the
point at which the contingent debt line crosses the fixed debt line in Figure 2 remains between 0.2
and 0.4 if we assume that Debtor's assets depreciate go% rather than 40% in a downturn, that the
initial value of those assets is $i5o rather than $125, or that Unsecured Creditor is owed $80 ra-
ther than $ioo. An important exception occurs with a change in the face value. As is seen in
Figure 3, doubling the face value causes the contingent debt to transfer more wealth than the
fixed debt at all available correlation levels.
37 Louis K.C. Chan et al., On Portfolio Optimization: Forecasting Covariances and Choosing
the Risk Model, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 937, 942 (ig9). The result was obtained by randomly se-
lecting 500 stocks from the New York and American stock exchanges for each year from 1968
through 1998, and calculating an average pairwise correlation for all sets. See id.
38 To be sure, the correlation between two companies' stock returns is not the same as the cor-
relation between one's stock performance and the other's insolvency risk, even though the two
measures of correlated risk are likely to be similar. The cited figure nonetheless suggests that the
internal correlations on most contingent debts found in the economy probably are significantly
greater than zero.
39 See Chan et al., supra note 37, at 943-44.
40 Many contingent debt contracts do not specify a face value, but rather expose the debtor to
a range of possible liability amounts based on the performance of the underlying "reference" asset.
For example, the liability generated by a put option depends on how far the price of the reference
stock drops below the strike price. If the liability range on a contingent claim straddles the value
of the debtor's equity, then the probability-weighted mean value of the liability determines
whether a graph of the wealth transfer relative to the correlation level looks like Figure 2 or
Figure 3.
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FIGURE 3. CONTINGENT VERSUS FIXED DEBT WEALTH
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Figure 3 reflects the same assumptions that were used for Figure 2,
except that the face value of Debtor's liability to Claimant (whether
contingent or fixed) is now assumed to be $50 rather than $25, and
thus greater than Debtor's starting equity value.41 One consequence of
this change is that the lower end of the internal correlation range along
the x-axis is now truncated, reflecting the fact that Debtor is always
insolvent when the contingent debt is triggered, making it impossible
for the internal correlation to drop below a certain level. However, the
independent risk of an asset downturn means that Debtor can fall in-
solvent even if the debt is not triggered, which is why the internal cor-
relation can still be less than 1.o.42
41 The formula for the premium that Claimant pays when V > A is:
P'= p(not DIR)*[C/V]*[A + P] + p(DIR)*[C/V]*d[A + P];
which solved for P'gives:
(6) P' = AC*[p(not DIT) + p(DIT)*d]i /[V- p(not DIT)*C - p(DIT)*dC].
The formula for the wealth transfer when V > A, defined again as the difference between Unse-
cured Creditor's expected recovery without a contract with Claimant and his recovery when there
is one, is:
T'= p(D)*dA + p(not D)*U - p(Dlnot R)*d[A + P7 - p(DIR)*d[A+P]*[U/V] - p(not Dlnot
R)*U - p(not DIR)*[A + P'j*[UIV];
which can be simplified as:
(7) T' = p(DIR)*d[A - (A + P')*(U/V)] + p(not DIR)*[U - (A + P')*(U/V)] - p(Dlnot
R)*dP.
The value on the y-axis line in Figure 3 is calculated by dividing T' by B as computed in equation
(i) in note ig, supra.
42 The correlation coefficient in Figure 3 is calculated using equation (2) in note 20, supra, ex-
cept that Y (the variable corresponding to the insolvency risk) is now set at i (representing insol-
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The most notable aspect of Figure 3 is that the contingent debt line
is everywhere higher than the fixed debt line. This result is unsurpris-
ing in the sense that the contingent debt is now a source of internal
correlation. But it further lays to rest any notion that contingent debt
presents the smaller opportunism hazard. When a contingent debt's
face value is greater than the debtor's equity value, the internal corre-
lation is always high, and therefore the contingent debt always cap-
tures more expected value from the debtor's unsecured creditors than
would a fixed debt of comparable size. But changes in the correlation
level still matter: as the internal correlation increases from its mini-
mum to its maximum possible level in Figure 3, the wealth transfer
away from Unsecured Creditor more than doubles.43
In evaluating the opportunism hazard suggested by Figure 3, it
should be recognized that the wealth transfers depicted there would
result not only from a single contingent debt with a large face value,
but also from a combination of smaller debts that are themselves posi-
tively correlated. For example, a firm might sell numerous put options
or credit default swaps on the same underlying risk. If the liabilities
from the individual contracts are themselves small, and their triggers
do not correlate with changes in the debtor's asset values, they might
initially pose no opportunism hazard. But if the firm continues to en-
ter into such contracts, a tipping point is reached at which the cumula-
tive effect of the liabilities (which are themselves positively correlated)
is sufficient to bankrupt the firm. And at that point a moral hazard
arises, because the firm can enrich its shareholders by selling addition-
al positively correlated claims whose downside risk is borne entirely by
the firm's unsecured creditors. The fact that correlated contingent
debts can have this cumulative impact is a further indictment of legal
rules that ignore correlations when determining whether a particular
debt is an opportunism threat.
A final point worth emphasizing about both Figures 2 and 3 is that
they reflect an assumption that Claimant is unsecured. This assump-
tion is realistic for many traditional types of contingent debt contracts,
such as loan guarantees. But it is possible to secure a contingent
claim, and special provisions of the Bankruptcy Code automatically
give many derivative counterparties the functional equivalent of a se-
cured claim. 44 And when a contingent claim is secured the opportun-
ism risk is even greater. Securing a claim increases the claimant's rela-
tive recovery in a bankruptcy proceeding, producing a larger transfer
vency) rather than o (representing solvency, as in Figure 2) in the outcome where a downturn
does not occur but the contingent debt is triggered.
43 This ratio falls if we further increase the contingent debt's face value.
44 See infra pp. I187-88.
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away from the debtor's unsecured creditors. 45 For example, if we se-
cure the contingent claim in Figure 2 - meaning we assume that
Claimant enjoys a prior claim on Debtor's assets rather than a pro rata
claim - the wealth transfer when the internal correlation is perfect
increases by 64%.46 To be sure, securing the fixed claim in that figure
also causes it to produce a larger transfer, but the amount of the in-
crease is 27% smaller.47 Scholars have known for some time that a se-
cured claim poses a wealth transfer hazard to a debtor's unsecured
creditors.48 But they have not recognized that the relative hazard is
even greater when the secured claim is contingent rather than fixed.
C. Shareholder Opportunism and the Risk-Return Tradeoff
The previous section shows that correlation-seeking makes share-
holders richer. Surprisingly, it usually also makes them safer. In this
way, correlation-seeking stands in stark contrast to other forms of
shareholder opportunism that scholars have studied. For example,
higher leverage can enrich shareholders by increasing the degree to
which creditors bear losses caused by declining asset values. (This is
different from correlation-seeking's wealth-transfer mechanism, which
instead increases the probability that creditors will bear losses caused
by the triggering of contingent debts.) But while higher leverage in-
creases expected shareholder returns, it also raises the volatility of
those returns,49 an unpleasant side effect for risk-averse shareholders.
Some of this increase in volatility can be neutralized if the sharehold-
ers hold a diversified investment portfolio. But diversification may
be infeasible for shareholders who wish to hold a controlling share
45 To be sure, this larger expected recovery translates into a larger premium. But as was true
for an unsecured claim, at positive correlation levels the larger premium is insufficient to counter-
act the claim's dilutive effect on the unsecured creditors.
46 For a secured claim with full priority over all of Debtor's assets, assuming C < dA, the for-
mula for the premium is:
(8) P" = p(R)*C.
Assuming that A > V, the formula for the transfer is:(9) T" = - p(DIR)*[dP"- C] - p(Dlnot R)*dP".
Plugging the other assumptions used in Figure 2 into these formulae gives a transfer for a per-
fectly correlated contingent claim of $2.35, as contrasted with a transfer of $1.43 when the claim
was unsecured.
47 Based on equations (8) and (9) in note 46, supra, the nominal transfer produced by the se-
cured fixed debt is $i.oo, as compared with a transfer of $0.33 when the debt was unsecured.
This change represents a marginal increase of $o.67, as compared with the marginal increase of
$0.92 for the perfectly correlated contingent debt.
48 For a review of this literature, see Squire, supra note 8, at 863-65.
49 See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE 345-46 (ioth ed. 2007) (noting that higher leverage increases the volatility of equity
returns); Yakov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade & Marcel Kahan, A New Governance Structure for
Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447, 464 (1999) (noting that an increase in equity return vola-
tility tends to enrich shareholders at the expense of creditors).
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block, and it is an option denied to managers paid in shares that the
managers are not permitted to touch for several years. Therefore,
higher leverage imposes a tradeoff between risk and return that in
many firms will tend to make it self-limiting.
A similar dynamic is seen with asset substitution, a stratagem in
which a firm borrows against low-risk (that is, low-variance) assets but
then exchanges them for high-risk (high-variance) assets before the
debt comes due.50 Asset substitution is not the same thing as reverse
correlation-seeking, which occurs when a firm acquires assets not be-
cause their value is highly variable, but because their variability,
whether high or low, is expected to coincide with changes in the firm's
liability levels. The thing that asset substitution and reverse correla-
tion-seeking have in common is that both increase the volatility of a
firm's net worth - meaning the simple arithmetic difference between
the firm's assets and liabilities.
What matters to shareholders, however, is not their firm's net
worth, but rather the value of their equity claims, which unlike net
worth is prevented from dropping below zero by the rule of limited
shareholder liability. And in terms of equity volatility, asset substitu-
tion and correlation-seeking usually are opposites. Thus, asset substi-
tution is like leverage in that it boosts the volatility of equity returns.5 1
For this reason, it often will be a hazard only when a firm has fallen
insolvent, at which point shareholders no longer have any value at
risk.
Correlation-seeking, by contrast, can escape the tradeoff between
risk and return. To be sure, whenever a firm takes on a new debt -
whether fixed or contingent - the resulting increase in leverage tends
to boost equity volatility.5 2 But with a contingent debt, the amount by
which equity volatility increases depends on the internal correlation.
And in most cases, the increase in volatility gets smaller as the internal
correlation gets higher, and disappears altogether when the correlation
50 See Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current
Theories, Io J. LEGAL STUD. I, i i (i98i).
51 Asset substitution is conceptualized here as a situation in which an indebted firm faces two
possible future states, one in which it does not suffer an asset downturn, and the other in which it
does. The firm owns one asset, A, and exchanges it for asset B, where B relative to A has both a
higher variance of future values and a lower expected value. It can be shown that the exchange
of A for B, if it increases the firm's expected equity value, also increases the variance of that val-
ue. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Deutsche Telekom, German Corporate Governance, and the Transition
Costs of Capitalism, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 185, 195-96 (noting that asset substitution in-
creases the volatility of equity returns).
52 New fixed debt (unless matched by a proportionate infusion of new equity capital) always
boosts equity volatility. New contingent debt typically does so as well, but an exception can occur
when the contingency and insolvency risks are both high and the internal correlation is deeply
negative. See infra note 6o.
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is perfect.5 3 Correlation-seeking therefore can confer a double benefit
on shareholders: higher returns plus lower risk. This means that,
when a firm is choosing among contingent debts of equal size, the one
that delivers the biggest increase in equity value usually will also im-
pose the smallest boost in equity volatility. And when a firm instead
engages in reverse correlation-seeking, the assets that deliver the larg-
est wealth transfer will also provide the greatest reduction in volatili-
ty.5 4 Correlation-seeking therefore is more pernicious than both leve-
rage and asset substitution, because only correlation-seeking typically
holds no downside for risk-averse shareholders.
Why does correlation-seeking defy the standard relationship be-
tween risk and return? The short answer is that a contingent debt can
affect equity volatility only to the extent of the probability that it will
be triggered when the debtor is otherwise solvent. If the debt comes
due when the debtor is insolvent, equity value cannot decrease any
further because it is already zero. Thus, correlation-seeking typically
reduces the volatility of a firm's equity value because it decreases the
chances that the firm's contingent debt will be triggered when the eq-
uity has any value.
As an illustration, consider the contingent debt from Figure 2, with
a face value equal to Debtor's starting equity value. As its internal
correlation rises from its lowest to its highest level, the expected value
of Shareholders' equity increases 7%.55 This is the effect of correla-
tion-seeking already discussed: as the internal correlation grows, so
does the wealth transfer. However, over the same correlation range
the volatility of Shareholders' equity decreases by 24%, as measured
by the equity value's standard deviation.5 6 In other words, risk falls
53 The net effect of the contract that creates the perfectly correlated contingent debt will be a
slight increase in equity volatility, because the premium will augment the debtor's equity value
and thus give shareholders more to lose in a downturn. But this volatility increase is not caused
by the triggering of the debt itself, the effects of which are borne entirely by the debtor's unse-
cured creditors.
54 This is an "all other things being equal" statement, meaning that it holds constant the prob-
ability that the assets will depreciate and permits variation only in the correlation between this
probability and the contingency risk.
55 The expected (or "mean") value of Shareholders' equity stake in Debtor is the sum of the
probability-weighted equity values in each of the model's four outcomes. For the assumptions
used for Figure 2, the equity value in the two outcomes in which Debtor suffers a downturn is
always zero. The formula for the expected equity value, taking into account the remaining two
outcomes, is:
(10) S = p(not Dinot R)*(A + P - C) + p(not DIR)*(A + P - V);
with P calculated using equation (3) in note 22, supra. When the correlation is at its lowest possi-
ble level (-o.i), S is $22.25. At the highest possible correlation (.o), S is $23.87.
56 Equity volatility is conventionally defined as the standard deviation of returns on equity.
Because Debtor's initial equity value is the same ($25) regardless of the internal correlation on the
contingent debt, a reduction in the standard deviation of the final equity value necessarily trans-
lates into a lower standard deviation of equity returns. The standard deviation is calculated using
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even as returns rise. The reason for this result in this particular exam-
ple is that there is a wide divergence between the mean value of Debt-
or's equity and its value in the specific outcome (solvent, triggered).
And this outcome by definition becomes less likely as the internal cor-
relation increases. It follows that, as the internal correlation increases,
equity volatility falls. To be sure, the increase in the internal correla-
tion boosts the volatility of Debtor's net worth, but these wider value
swings are suffered by Unsecured Creditor, not Shareholders.
The same dynamic is seen with the contingent debt from Figure 3,
with a face value greater than Debtor's initial equity value. As that
debt's internal correlation rises from its lowest to its highest level, the
expected value of equity increases 6%, but the standard deviation
drops 30%.57 Thus, once again, higher returns bring lower risk. And
lower volatility accompanies higher returns even if we consider a third
case that is not addressed in the previous section - one in which the
debtor falls insolvent only if its assets depreciate and its contingent
debt comes due. This would be true if, for example, we returned to
the arrangement from Figure 2 but assumed that Debtor's assets lost
15% of their value in a downturn rather than 40%. This case is inter-
esting because, unlike in the previous two, an increase in the internal
correlation makes it more likely that Debtor will fall insolvent.5 8 Yet
correlation-seeking still delivers its double benefit: the expected equity
value rises with the correlation level (by 6%) while the standard devia-
tion falls (by 9%).59
the expected value of equity as provided by equation (io) in note 55, supra, and the equity value
in each of the model's four possible outcomes. The equity value is A + P - U in outcome (solvent,
not triggered), A + P - V in outcome (solvent, triggered), and zero in the two insolvency outcomes.
57 The expected value of Shareholders' equity stake given the assumptions used for Figure 3
is:
(11) S' = p(not Dinot R)*(A + P'- C);
with P' given by equation (6) in note 41, supra. The standard deviation is calculated using S' and
the equity value in each of the model's four possible outcomes. The equity value is A + P - U in
outcome (solvent, not triggered), and zero in the other three outcomes.
58 When the downturn risk and contingency risk have their lowest possible negative correla-
tion in this example, Debtor's risk of insolvency is o%; when they are perfectly correlated, it is
Io%. By contrast, Debtor's risk of insolvency is a constant io% across all correlation levels in
Figure 2, because in that figure Debtor is insolvent if and only if a downturn occurs. In Figure 3,
Debtor's insolvency risk actually decreases from 20% to io% as the internal correlation rises from
its lowest to its highest possible level.
59 The formula for the premium in this example is P as given by equation (3) in note 22, supra.
The only structural difference between this case and the one from Figure 2 is that Debtor is now
solvent when a downturn occurs but the triggering event does not occur, and this change does not
affect the premium because the contingent debt has no value to Claimant unless it becomes paya-
ble. The formula for the expected value of Shareholders' equity stake in this example is:
(12) S" = p(not Dlnot R)*(A + P - C) + p(not DIR)*(A + P - V) + p(Dlnot R)*(d(A + P)) -
U).
The standard deviation is calculated using S" and the equity value in each of the example's four
possible outcomes. The equity value is A + P - U in the outcome (no downturn, not triggered),
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It should be recognized that correlation-seeking's promise of lower
risk is not ironclad. Exceptions can occur if the contingent debt is es-
pecially small, or especially likely to be triggered. But these exceptions
are relatively unimportant because they involve cases in which correla-
tion-seeking is already less attractive as an opportunism device. For
example, if we take the contingent debt from Figure 2 but assume that
its face value is $4 rather than $25, an increase in the correlation no
longer suppresses equity volatility, because the debt itself is too small
to drive the direction of equity swings. But reducing the face value by
this much also causes a sharp decrease in the size of the wealth trans-
fer, meaning that such a debt is less of an opportunism hazard in any
event. Alternatively, equity volatility rises rather than falls as the cor-
relation increases if we take the arrangement from Figure 2 but as-
sume that the contingency and insolvency risks are each 5o% rather
than io%.60 Volatility rises with the correlation level in this example
because, when the triggering event is that likely, Debtor's equity value
is closer to its mean value when the contingent debt is triggered than
when it is not. However, as was noted in the previous section, the
wealth transfer caused by a contingent debt contract relative to the
transfer caused by a fixed debt contract decreases as the triggering
event becomes more likely. Therefore, neither this nor the previous
example contradicts a general conclusion that there is an inverse rela-
tionship between risk and reward in those situations where correlation-
seeking captures the most wealth for shareholders relative to other op-
portunism options.
The fact that correlation-seeking can make shareholders both rich-
er and safer has important policy implications. For example, correla-
tion-seeking may be especially likely in firms whose shareholders are
not diversified, the opposite of the case with higher leverage and asset
substitution. In addition, fraudulent transfer law generally assumes
that a debtor is unlikely to engage in opportunism toward creditors
unless the debtor is already insolvent. While this assumption makes
sense for opportunism devices that increase equity volatility, it is inapt
for correlation-seeking, which will be attractive even in firms that are
fully solvent. Lawmakers should adjust fraudulent transfer rules for
contingent debt accordingly, as will be discussed in section I.B.
A + P - V in the outcome (no downturn, triggered), d(A + P) - U in the outcome (downturn, not
triggered), and zero in the outcome (downturn, triggered).
60 This example is exceptional for a second reason: a contract for a contingent debt with such
a high probability can cause the absolute level of the debtor's equity volatility to be lower than it
would be without the contract. This effect occurs because such a contingent debt can have a neg-
ative correlation that approaches -i.o, in which case the contract can neutralize much of the equi-
ty volatility that would otherwise result from fluctuations in the debtor's asset values. Such a
contract is unlikely to be found in the real world, however, because a negative internal correlation
on a contract with such a large face value transfers wealth away from shareholders.
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D. The Social Costs of Correlation-Seeking
The discussion so far has depicted correlation-seeking as a zero-
sum game between shareholders and creditors. But correlation-
seeking's impact on the distribution of wealth is not its only, or even
most important, social consequence. Correlation-seeking matters
mainly because it is wasteful: firms that seek to transfer wealth end up
destroying wealth.
Like any other legal arrangement, a contract that creates a contin-
gent debt generates both costs and benefits. Ideally, the parties to the
contract fully internalize the contract's economic consequences and
therefore enter into it only when doing so is expected to create social
wealth. But a value transfer at the expense of unsecured creditors acts
like a thumb on the scale, increasing the benefits to the parties for a
reason that has nothing to do with actual value creation. For this rea-
son, contingent debt contracts that expropriate value from creditors
will be overused, producing a net loss of social wealth.
Perhaps the most important social cost of contingent debt overuse
is overinvestment. Many contingent debt contracts - including credit
default swaps, put options, and guarantees - serve as insurance poli-
cies on loans and other investments. In an efficient market, an indi-
vidual makes an investment only if the expected social returns exceed
those from investing the same capital elsewhere. An insurance policy
that insulates the investor from downside risk does not change this
calculus as long as the risk is borne by the insurer, because then the in-
surer demands a premium at least as large as the expected loss the pol-
icy protects against. But if the expected loss is borne instead by the
insurer's unsecured creditors, the insurer will be willing to sell the pol-
icy at a discount, effectively splitting the opportunistic value transfer
with the investor.61 The result is a misallocation of capital, because
investors purchase those assets for which underpriced insurance is
available rather than the assets that generate the highest returns when
the impact on all parties is taken into account.62 Pointedly, the recent
overinvestment in housing almost certainly was exacerbated by the
availability of insurance on subprime mortgage-backed securities (in
the form of credit default swaps) from AIG, and on prime mortgage-
61 This observation implies that the calculations in section L.B understate value transfers by
assuming a premium equal to Claimant's expected recovery on her claim rather than the expected
burden of the claim on Shareholders, which is lower whenever the internal correlation is positive,
and indeed is zero when the correlation is perfect. The extreme case - in which Claimant pays
no premium at all - is addressed in Figure 4 in section III.B.
62 Overinvestment is also a social cost of other types of shareholder opportunism, including
asset substitution and misuse of the secured loan. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 6, at 899 (se-
cured borrowing); Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Anal-
ysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 1i8-I9 (1979) (asset substitution).
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backed securities (in the form of guarantees) from Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. Each of these firms was itself heavily invested in the
same types of assets on which it was selling insurance, and therefore
was highly unlikely to be solvent if those insurance claims ever came
due.
A second social cost of contingent debt overuse is an increase in the
risk that debtors will become financially distressed. Distress becomes
more likely because the contingent liabilities may themselves be large
enough to render the debtor insolvent,63 and because an inverse rela-
tionship between asset and liability levels makes it more likely that an
otherwise shallow asset downturn will be sufficient to drive the debtor
into bankruptcy.64 Financial distress is wealth-destroying because it
disrupts productive activity, causing managers to scramble for imme-
diate sources of cash rather than focus on long-term value creation.
65
Similarly, when a debtor stumbles, its creditors try to liquidate their
positions ahead of a bankruptcy filing, disrupting the normal opera-
tions of debtor and creditor alike. 66 Finally, firms in extremis are more
likely to engage in wealth-destroying asset substitution, which unlike
correlation-seeking increases the volatility of equity returns, and thus
is a hazard primarily when shareholders have little left to lose.6
7
If the firms that engage in correlation-seeking are financial inter-
mediaries, then their greater chance of distress may present a systemic
risk to the broader economy. The notion that the collapse of a bank or
other financial institution can impose system-wide costs is a central
premise of the Obama Administration's broad new proposals for regu-
63 Although correlation-seeking will usually increase the debtor's insolvency risk, this conse-
quence is not inevitable. For example, insolvency risk increases whenever a firm incurs a contin-
gent liability that is itself large enough to cause insolvency. However, if we hold the face value of
this liability constant, reverse correlation-seeking actually reduces insolvency risk by decreasing
the chances of a downturn-induced insolvency as an independent event. Thus, Debtor's insolven-
cy risk in Figure 3 actually decreases from 20% to lo% as the internal correlation moves from its
lowest to its highest level.
64 This possibility corresponds to the third case described in section I.C. See supra p. I 179.
65 See Gregor Andrade & Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly Is Financial (Not Economic) Dis-
tress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed, 53 J. FIN. 1443,
1471 (1998) (noting that financial distress destroys wealth by causing firms to liquidate assets ra-
ther than make capital expenditures); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Cor-
porate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 538 (1983) (noting that distraction of managers is
one of the "heavy costs of financial distress').
66 These costs are illustrated by the impact of collateral calls on AIG in September 2oo8, de-
scribed in the next Part. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Essay, Deconstructing
Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, Io8 COLUM. L. REV.
231, 250 (2oo8) (identifying the reluctance of various creditor groups to deal with an insolvent
firm as a social cost of financial distress).
67 See Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incen-
tives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159, II85 (1994) (noting that asset substitution is more likely when a
firm is insolvent); Squire, supra note 8, at 820-21 (same).
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lating the financial sector.68 If this view is correct, correlation-seeking
is particularly costly in the derivatives market, where most sellers are
financial intermediaries. And in settings in which regulators are un-
willing to let firms fail, correlation-seeking makes government bailouts
more likely.
A final set of social costs will result from the defensive efforts that
creditors take to protect themselves against opportunism. In order to
deter correlation-seeking, creditors must negotiate and enforce loan
covenants that tailor the terms of lending to the risks created by the
debtor's ongoing dealings with third parties. And covenants are inef-
fective unless creditors monitor the debtor, because monetary damages
for covenant violations will be inadequate if the violations are discov-
ered only after the debtor has fallen insolvent and hence is judgment-
proof.69 But monitoring is costly, and creditors who plan to monitor
will demand higher interest rates up front as compensation.70 Or, ra-
ther than monitor, creditors will simply demand a higher interest rate
from all debtors to offset expected losses from opportunism. In either
case, the increase in borrowing costs will act like a tax on credit, pro-
ducing a deadweight loss by making it harder for firms to fund new
projects.71 Importantly, debtors will have to pay higher interest rates
even if they do not act opportunistically after they borrow, meaning
that their mere option to engage in correlation-seeking will cause a loss
of social wealth.
II. CORRELATION-SEEKING AND THE CRISIS OF 2008
This Part considers the role of correlation-seeking in the financial
crisis of 2oo8. That crisis saw the collapse of storied Wall Street firms
and government bailouts of private companies on an unprecedented
scale. A key aspect of the crisis that has been ignored by standard ac-
68 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION passim (2009)
[hereinafter TREASURY REPORT], available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/Final
Report web.pdf. A potential illustration of systemic risk is the fact that the September 20o08
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers precipitated a run on money market funds because one fund -
the Reserve Primary Money Fund - owned large amounts of Lehman Brothers commercial pa-
per. Daisy Maxey, Expense Tally for Reserve Primary Since "Breaking Buck": $r6.6 Million,
WALL ST. J., June 13, 20o9, at B6. This run caused money market funds to stop buying commer-
cial paper, thereby denying firms a key source of short-term financing.
69 The inadequacy of monetary damages in this context is the reason that the standard con-
tractual remedy for a covenant violation is to accelerate the debtor's repayment obligation. Ka-
han & Rock, supra note 7, at 302.
70 See F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV 1393, 1440-41 (1986). As
an alternative, creditors might try to protect themselves by demanding a secured claim, but that
arrangement creates its own set of costs, mostly by producing an opportunistic wealth transfer to
the secured creditor's advantage. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 6, at 870-71.
71 Squire, supra note 8, at 82o-2 1.
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counts is how conduct consistent with correlation-seeking brought
down the three firms that received the biggest bailouts: AIG, Fannie
Mae, and Freddie Mac.7 2 In all three cases, the concept of correlation-
seeking explains how managerial decisions that caused the firms to
suffer deep losses may in fact have been consistent with the managers'
duty to maximize shareholder value. Without a proper understanding
of the conduct that preceded each firm's collapse, lawmakers will be
unable to correct the incentives that increase the risk of another finan-
cial crisis in the future.
Besides being the biggest bailout recipients, AIG, Fannie, and
Freddie are interesting because they illustrate two different forms that
correlation-seeking can take. AIG's conduct during the run-up to 2008
is primarily consistent with reverse correlation-seeking, whereby a firm
reallocates its investment portfolio into assets that increase the internal
correlations on the firm's contingent debts. Fannie and Freddie, by
contrast, illustrate the type of correlation-seeking that occurs when a
firm has passed the "tipping point" where its contingent debts are large
enough in themselves to cause insolvency, and the firm piles on addi-
tional correlated debts that pose no downside risk to shareholders.
In both cases, the broader point remains that conduct consistent
with correlation-seeking helps to explain why the firms suffered such
calamitous losses, at taxpayer expense, when their correlated risks
materialized.
A. Raising Correlation Through Asset Purchases: AIG
Perhaps the most notorious financial crisis bailout was that of the
multinational insurer AIG, whose trades in financial derivatives are
widely blamed for the company's spectacular unraveling in September
2oo8.' 3 To many observers, AIG's implosion was the fulfillment of
Warren Buffet's prophecy that derivative contracts would prove to be
"financial weapons of mass destruction.' 4 The company merits spe-
cial attention here not only because of the amount of bailout money
it received, but also because the Obama Administration has cited AIG
as exhibit one in its case for more aggressive federal regulation of
derivatives.
The standard account of what happened at AIG - and the ac-
count that the administration has adopted - is founded upon a key
misperception. According to this view, a small band of derivatives
72 For a summary of the various bailout programs and amounts paid on behalf of the largest
recipients, see Adding Up the Government's Total Bailout Tab, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 20o9, http://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/02/o4business/20090205-bailout-totals-graphic.html.
73 See, e.g., Brady Dennis & Robert O'Harrow, Jr., A Crack in the System, WASH. POST, Dec.
30, 2oo8, at Ai.
74 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2002 ANNUAL LETTER TO SHAREHOLDERS 15 (20O3).
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traders, operating at the periphery of AIG's mainline insurance busi-
nesses, was able to bring an otherwise sound corporate giant to its
knees. 5 But in fact the liabilities on AIG's derivative contracts were
not big enough in themselves to break the company. Rather, the con-
duct that undid AIG was a company-wide affair, in which derivatives
traders at an AIG subsidiary sold contingent debts linked to subprime
mortgages, and then fund managers at the AIG parent company
cranked up the internal correlations on those debts by purchasing risky
mortgage-backed securities for the company's general investment port-
folio. When the housing market collapsed, it was the combined dam-
age to both sides of AIG's balance sheet that brought the company to
the brink of bankruptcy.
The derivatives that bear the popular blame for AIG's failure are
credit default swaps sold by Financial Products, a distinct legal entity
in the AIG corporate group. A credit default swap is a natural prod-
uct for an insurer to sell, as such a contract insures the performance of
a debt-like instrument such as a bond. The buyer of the swap makes
one or more premium payments to the swap's issuer - also known as
the "protection seller" - who in return agrees to pay the buyer the dif-
ference between the debt instrument's face value and its market value
if the instrument defaults. And Financial Products had a strong com-
petitive edge in the swap business because the AIG parent, which en-
joyed a perfect AAA credit rating, had unconditionally guaranteed all
of its obligations.76 Counterparties were therefore willing to enter into
swap contracts with Financial Products without requiring that the di-
vision "post" (set aside) cash or low-risk securities to serve as collateral.
Initially, Financial Products sold swaps only on corporate bonds.77
However, as the housing market expanded during the early years of
the past decade, the division also began selling swaps on mortgage-
backed securities, which are bonds that represent claims on cash flows
produced by pools of mortgages.78 Many such securities were issued
by government-sponsored entities such as Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, which assembled the underlying mortgage pools and guaranteed
the securities that were paid from those pools.7 9 However, Financial
Products also sold swaps on securities backed by "subprime" mortgag-
75 See, e.g., Dennis & O'Harrow, supra note 73 (blaming the fall of AIG entirely on its deriva-
tives sales).
76 Am. Int'l Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form io-K), at 179 n.12(d) (Feb. 28, 2008) [hereinaf-
ter AIG 2007 io-K Report].
77 Dennis & O'Harrow, supra note 73.
78 Robert O'Harrow, Jr. & Brady Dennis, Downgrades and Downfall, WASH. POST, Dec. 31,
2oo8, at As.
79 See Christopher L. Peterson, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Home Mortgage Foreclo-
sure Crisis, Io Loy. J. PUB. INT. L. i49, 149 (2009).
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es that were too risky to qualify for Fannie or Freddie guarantees, and
that instead were pooled by wholly private firms.8 0
Financial Products' lucrative swap sales came to an end in 2005,
after a government investigation into AIG's reported earnings8 ' led the
rating agencies to downgrade the company to AA. 82 This change de-
prived Financial Products of its competitive advantage in the swap
business because it meant that the division now had to post collateral
on its derivative positions. 3 Unsurprisingly, not long thereafter the
division's managers decided to stop selling credit default swaps - al-
though, portentously, they did not unwind the contracts the division
had already sold.84
By the time it stopped selling swaps, AIG was deeply exposed to
the housing market, with a total notional value on its subprime-linked
swaps of approximately $60 billion1 5 Moreover, the company derived
little diversification benefit from the large number of swaps it had
sold, because the contingent liabilities from the individual contracts
were highly correlated with each other. This was because Financial
Products had sold swaps almost exclusively on securities that rep-
resented the senior tiers of the underlying mortgage pools. 8 6 Those
pools were structured to pay senior tiers first if the mortgages under-
performed, which meant that junior tiers would absorb essentially all
idiosyncratic (that is, borrower-specific) and regional risk associated
with the mortgages.8 7 Accordingly, the senior tiers were considered
the least risky, and indeed regularly received AAA scores from the rat-
ing agencies.8 8 However, as the rating agencies themselves under-
80 See id. at 161-62.
81 See Dennis & O'Harrow, supra note 73.
82 A credit rating reflects a debt obligation's perceived default risk and hence suggests the
minimum yield that investors will require in order to be willing to buy the obligation. This par-
ticular rating is from Standard & Poor's Financial Ratings; Fitch Ratings and Moody's Investors
Service also downgraded AIG's long-term debt rating during the same period. Am. Int'l Group,
Inc., Annual Report (Form io-K), at 14 (Mar. I6, 2oo6) [hereinafter AIG 2005 io-K Report].
83 Id. at 15.
84 AIG insiders have told reporters that Financial Products stopped selling credit default
swaps in 2005 because executives were concerned at that point about the company's concentrated
exposure to the subprime housing market. See, e.g., Michael Lewis, The Man Who Crashed the
World, VANITY FAIR, Aug. 20o9, at 98, 137-38. This explanation is contradicted by the fact that
executives permitted the AIG parent to make heavy purchases of subprime mortgages in 2006 and
2007. See AIG 2007 io-K Report, supra note 76, at loS.
85 This figure is from 2007. AIG 2007 Io-K Report, supra note 76, at 122 n.(b). AIG did not
disclose its notional swap exposure for 2005. However, the figure is unlikely to have changed sig-
nificantly in the interim given that the company stopped selling swaps in 2005 but did not unwind
the positions it had already incurred.
86 Id. at 122.
87 See Joshua D. Coval et. al., The Economics of Structured Finance 6 (Harvard Bus. Sch.,
Working Paper No. 09-060, 20o8), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/og-o6o.pdf.
88 Id. at 3-4.
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stood,8 9 there was one event that could trigger deep losses on the se-
nior tiers: a sustained drop in housing prices that spanned multiple
regions. 90 For this reason, the only event that could trigger a large
claim on any particular subprime-linked swap contract - that is, a
general drop in housing prices - would also cause large claims on the
other contracts to be triggered at the same time.
Despite its concentrated nature, AIG's exposure on its subprime-
linked swaps would not have been sufficient in itself to bankrupt the
company. Liability for the full $6o billion notional amount was always
extremely unlikely, since this would require that the underlying houses
prove to be completely worthless rather than just badly overpriced.
And AIG's overall equity value at the end of 2005 (when it ended
swap sales) was $86 billion. 91 In other words, AIG was in the position
depicted by Figure 2 rather than Figure 3, and it could have contained
the downside risk on its swap contracts by investing in assets that
were unlikely to depreciate at the same time the swaps were triggered.
Rather than hedge itself on the asset side of the ledger, however,
AIG doubled down. Just as Financial Products was shutting down
swap sales in 2005, fund managers at the AIG parent started buying
up subprime mortgage-backed securities for the company's general in-
vestment portfolio. This buying spree accelerated in 20o6 and did not
end until 2007, at which point the portfolio held $45 billion in sub-
prime mortgage-backed securities - more than a tenfold increase
from the amount held just three years earlier.92 And Financial Prod-
ucts had itself acquired another $i6 billion in subprime securities,
bringing the company-wide total at the end of 2007 to $61 billion.93
More than 90% of these securities represented the senior tiers of the
underlying mortgage pools, 94 and thus matched exactly the risk from
the company's swap positions. Finally, the company owned another
89 See id. at 23 (noting that ratings analysts relied on models that the analysts knew would
"break down" if housing prices stopped rising (internal quotation mark omitted)).
90 See id. at 20 (noting that exposure on diversified swaps was driven entirely by systematic
risk, an example of which is housing price changes that cannot be diversified away by investing
across multiple regions).
91 AIG 2005 io-K Report, supra note 82, at 24.
92 In 2007, AIG (other than Financial Products) held $3.7 billion in subprime mortgages of
pre-2005 vintage. AIG 2007 io-K Report, supra note 76, at 1o5 (including securities classified by
the company as both "Alt-A" and "subprime," both categories being subprime in the sense that
neither was guaranteed by government-sponsored entities such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).
Adding in the 2005 to 2007 vintage holdings produces a total of $44.9 billion. Assuming that all
of the pre-205 vintage holdings were purchased before 2005, this marks a twelvefold increase. If
some of these earlier vintages instead were purchased during the reference period, the ratio is
even higher.
93 Id. at IO4.
94 Id. at 1o5 (consisting of the sum of $22.5 billion in AAA Alt-A securities and $18.5 billion in
AAA subprime securities, divided by the sum of $23.7 billion in total Alt-A securities and $21.2
billion in total subprime securities, which results in 9i%).
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$48 billion in mortgage-backed securities that, while not classified as
"subprime," nevertheless were not guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Fred-
die Mac, and hence were highly vulnerable to a real estate downturn. 95
Therefore, the company's total exposure to the at-risk portion of the
mortgage market at the end of 2007, including both the company's
swap exposure and its holdings of nonguaranteed mortgage-backed se-
curities, was $169 billion, as compared with a company equity value of
$96 billion.96 When the market for mortgage-backed securities col-
lapsed in September 2oo8, this exposure was more than enough to
render the company insolvent. 97
The series of decisions by which AIG tied its fate to the mortgage
market contradicts the standard model of the insurance business, in
which insurers hedge the risks on the policies they sell by investing the
premiums in safe assets. But AIG's choices make sense if the goal was
to maximize shareholder returns. Thus, the company first used its
AAA rating to earn high premiums from sales of swaps linked to sub-
prime mortgages. Then, after a ratings downgrade brought swap sales
to an end, the company cranked up the internal correlations on the
contingent debts from those swaps by buying up mortgage-backed se-
curities for its investment portfolio. Those securities were highly un-
likely to lose value except in circumstances when deep liability on the
swaps would be triggered at the same time. Therefore, by reallocating
such a large portion of its investment portfolio into mortgage-backed
assets, AIG shifted more of the potential gains from that portfolio to
shareholders, and it shifted more of the downside risk from its swap
positions onto the company's general creditors.
Who exactly were the creditors that stood to lose from the high in-
ternal correlations on AIG's swap liabilities? Importantly, the answer
is not - or at least not mainly - the swap counterparties themselves.
Those claimants were protected by special Bankruptcy Code provi-
sions that exempt derivative counterparties from the Code's automatic
stay and from its prohibitions on fraudulent transfers, preferences, and
95 These securities consisted of $2 1 billion in "prime" but nonetheless nonguaranteed residen-
tial mortgage-backed securities, $4 billion in "other housing-related" securities, and $23 billion in
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). Id. at 104. Along with AIG's subprime in-
vestments, these assets lost value in 2007. Id. And this trend accelerated in 2008. Am. Int'l
Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form io-K), at 16I (Mar. 2, 2009) [hereinafter AIG 2008 io-K Re-
port].
96 AIG 2007 io-K Report, supra note 76, at 97.
97 AIG reported losses in 2008 of $99 billion. AIG 2008 io-K Report, supra note 95, at 36. As
noted above, AIG's equity value at the end of 2007 was $96 billion. In addition, another $5 bil-
lion in losses were recorded for the first quarter of 2009. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., Quarterly Report
(Form io-Q), at 5 (May 7, 2oo9). These reported losses for 20o8 and early 2oo9 almost certainly
understate the actual damage to the company's intrinsic value as a result of the housing market
collapse because they fail to exclude benefits that AIG received from its bailout.
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ipso facto clauses. 98 Because of those exemptions, the counterparties
could have foreclosed on collateral after AIG filed for bankruptcy,
even if AIG had posted the collateral while insolvent. In other words,
AIG's swap buyers were secured to the extent of their collateral, as
there was no risk that they would have to share that collateral with
AIG's general creditors. 99
Thus, most of the expected burden from AIG's contingent debts
was borne not by the swap buyers, but rather by two other groups of
AIG creditors. The group most directly imperiled was the general
(that is, nonderivative) creditors of Financial Products and of the AIG
parent, which had guaranteed all of Financial Products' obligations. 100
And a second, even larger group that was placed at risk was the multi-
tude of policyholders who had bought AIG's garden-variety insurance
and annuity products. 10 1 These policyholders were supposed to be
protected by state insurance regulations that limit insurer investments
in risky assets and give policyholders priority of claim if the insurer
fails.102 But AIG skirted the intent of these laws through its "securities
lending program," whereby it lent regulated assets such as blue chip
stocks to third parties in exchange for cash collateral, and then used
that cash to buy mortgage-backed securities.10 3 When the market for
these securities collapsed in September 2008, AIG ended up owing
98 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(6)-(7), 362(b)(17), 546(e)-(g), 555, 556, 559, 560 (2006); see also Edward
R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New Bankruptcy Code: Insulating Mar-
kets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 641, 651
(2005) (noting that amendments in 2005 to the Code's definition of "swap agreement" widened the
exemptions to cover essentially all derivatives). To be precise, counterparties are exempt from
provisions relating to "constructive" fraudulent transfers, but not from those directed at intention-
al fraud. i i U.S.C. § 546 (e)-(g) (cross-referencing 1i U.S.C. § 548(a)(I)(A)).
99 Although AIG eventually ran out of collateral when its credit rating was again downgraded
in September 20o8, the amount of collateral it was able to post before it received its first bailout
loan covered most of the losses on its counterparties' underlying securities. By August 31, 2oo8,
AIG had posted $22 billion to its swap counterparties, almost all of which went to those that had
purchased default protection on subprime securities. AIG 2008 io-K Report, supra note 95, at 3,
146. Continuing deterioration in the value of AIG's own mortgage-backed assets led the rating
agencies to downgrade AIG again on September 15, 2oo8, which in turn led to further collateral
calls of approximately $i i billion. Id. at 4, 146. AIG was unable to meet these collateral calls in
full until it received a loan from the New York Federal Reserve on September 22, 2008. Id. at 5.
100 These unsecured creditors were owed $1o8 billion at the end of 2007. AIG 2007 io-K Re-
port, supra note 76, at 89.
101 AIG owed these policyholders more than $420 billion in 2007. Id. at 131.
102 See id. at 13-14, 16 (describing state-law restrictions on the investment activity of AIG's
insurance subsidiaries); Patrick Collins, Note, HMO Eligibility for Bankruptcy: The Case for Fed-
eral Definitions of 1o9(b)(2) Entities, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 425, 431 (1994) (noting that
state insolvency proceedings generally give policyholders priority of claim).
103 AIG 2008 io-K Report, supra note 95, at i66. At the end of 2007, AIG's outstanding obliga-
tions under this program were $76 billion, two-thirds of the proceeds from which were invested in
subprime assets. AIG 2007 io-K Report, supra note 76, at io8.
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these third parties more than $40 billion, 10 4 a deficit the AIG parent
could not cover because of the simultaneous triggering of collateral
calls on the swap contracts.10 5
Of course, AIG's various unsecured creditors did not ultimately
bear the impact of the company's decision to go "double long" on the
housing market. In a series of bailout measures that began in Septem-
ber 2008 and continued through 2009, the federal government spent
more than $12o billion keeping AIG out of bankruptcy.10 6 Therefore,
the wealth transfer produced by the high internal correlations on
AIG's swap positions has been suffered not by AIG's own creditors,
but rather by another large group of unsecured "creditors": U.S. tax-
payers. To the extent that such a bailout was foreseeable, it only
would have exacerbated the opportunism hazard by undermining the
incentive for AIG's creditors to monitor in order to protect themselves.
The account of AIG's conduct offered here might seem to contra-
dict media reports suggesting that AIG's managers thought that fears
of a housing bubble were overblown and consequently that the risk of
deep liability on the company's swaps was remote. 10 7 But it must be
remembered that the relevant question for correlation-seeking purpos-
es is not whether the debtor's managers think that a contingent liabili-
ty is particularly likely to come due. Rather, the question is whether
the managers believe that, if the triggering event (however unlikely)
does occur, the debtor will probably be insolvent, due to asset devalua-
tion or otherwise. And there can be little doubt that informed AIG
managers would have understood that the risk from the firm's mort-
gage-linked swaps was highly correlated with the risk that the compa-
ny's own mortgage-backed securities would lose value. Indeed, the
fact that AIG had matched the specific risk type across its balance
sheet - on both sides, exposing itself only to the senior tiers of the un-
derlying mortgage pools - made the correlation all the more evident.
More broadly, there is evidence that a well-understood process of
correlation-seeking was at the heart of AIG's swap business even be-
fore AIG's managers bet the firm on the housing market. When Fi-
nancial Products first began selling swaps on corporate bonds in the
late 1990s, the division's computer models predicted that liability
would be triggered only in the event of a "full-blown depression.'108
104 Press Release, Am. Int'l Group, Inc., AIG Discloses Counterparties to CDS, GIA and Secu-
rities Lending Transactions (Mar. i5, 2oo9), available at http://www.businesswire.com/newshome/
200903I5005036/en.
105 See id.
106 See Serena Ng et al., In Battle with U.S. over Pay, AIG Chief Meets His Match, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 24, 2009, at Ai.
107 See, e.g., O'Harrow & Dennis, supra note 78.
108 Dennis & O'Harrow, supra note 73.
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From this prediction, the division's managers concluded that the pre-
miums on these early swap sales were "almost free money."'10 9 The ba-
sis for this conclusion would not have been the one later offered in
newspaper reports - namely that, in case of a general depression, "the
holders of swaps would almost certainly be wiped out, so how could
they even collect?" 110 A bankrupt firm can still sue to collect on its
contracts, a fact that these sophisticated managers would have under-
stood. Rather, the more accurate statement is that, in case of a severe
depression, AIG would probably be wiped out, because the company's
investment portfolio was tied to the performance of the general econ-
omy. Those swaps on corporate bonds therefore were contingent debts
that the company's shareholders - as opposed to its general creditors
- would almost certainly never be called upon to pay.
As it turned out, the company's mortgage-linked swaps - in con-
trast with its earlier, corporate bond-linked swaps - were in fact trig-
gered during a severe economic downturn that some have compared to
a depression. 1 ' This does not mean, however, that AIG's concen-
trated bets on the housing market make sense only if its managers
foresaw a tight link between the housing market and the performance
of the broader economy. To the contrary, the heavy purchases of
mortgage-backed securities from 2005 to 2007 are more consistent with
a belief that the downside risk on the mortgage-linked swaps was sec-
tor-specific, as contrasted with the downside risk from the earlier,
bond-linked swaps. Nonetheless, both examples suggest that the op-
portunism hazard may be highest when contingent debts constitute
what might be called "end of the world insurance" - that is, insurance
against the risk of an especially broad and deep economic downturn.
This is because an economy-wide collapse is likely to impair asset val-
ues enough to leave the insurance sellers insolvent regardless of
whether their contingent debts are triggered.
While AIG's credit default swap sales are especially notorious, it is
unlikely that the insurer is the only firm that has used derivatives to
create contingent debts with high internal correlations. 12 A provoca-
tive observation in this regard is that approximately 8o% of credit de-
fault swaps have been purchased by parties that - unlike most of
AIG's counterparties - did not own the underlying "reference" as-
109 Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
110 Id.
II See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND
THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009).
112 Indeed, the company's sales of credit default swaps accounted for only about i% of the
market. Houman B. Shadab, Guilty by Association? Regulating Credit Default Swaps, 4 ENTRE-
PRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 407, 417 (2010).
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set.'1 3 Such buyers are not seeking protection against downside risk,
and instead may be acting on a belief that the swaps are underpriced
relative to the expected value of future payouts. And correlation-
seeking is a reason that sustained underpricing can occur, because it
causes sales to be subsidized by expected wealth transfers from the sel-
lers' unsecured creditors. In other words, correlation-seeking makes it
rational for both buyer and seller to agree to a premium that is smaller
than the contract's expected payout. This observation suggests that
the correlation-seeking hazard presented by derivatives extends well
beyond AIG's swaps on mortgage-backed securities, even if those
swaps offer the most conspicuous example.
B. Beyond the Tipping Point: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
The only firms to elicit even more bailout spending than AIG are
the government-sponsored mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, which have suffered combined losses of nearly $19o billion since
the middle of 2007.114 Viewed by government officials as too impor-
tant to let fail, the firms have been kept afloat by a staggering $1.4
trillion in bailout spending. ' As with AIG, the standard story on
why these firms failed so dramatically is at best misleading. Media re-
ports have suggested that the firms collapsed because they took on too
much fixed debt, or because they overinvested in subprime assets.
Both of these stories are contradicted by the fact that Fannie Mae has
lost almost twice as much money as Freddie Mac has, even though
Fannie had a lower leverage ratio and invested only half as much in
subprime assets. Only when one observes that the firms incurred mas-
sive contingent debts during the housing bubble, debts that were likely
to be triggered simultaneously in circumstances when the firms' assets
would also plummet in value, does the scale of their losses begin to
make sense. In other words, the main reason that Fannie and Freddie
have cost taxpayers so much is that they took on correlated contingent
debts that posed essentially no downside risk to their shareholders.
Congress created the Federal National Mortgage Association -
better known as Fannie Mae - in 1938 for the purpose of providing
113 Dawn Kopecki & Shannon D. Harrington, Banning "Naked" Default Swaps May Raise
Corporate Funding Costs, BLOOMBERG, July 24, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.comlappslnews?
pid=2o6oi 2o8&sid=aoWiVTiv9q2A.
114 During the nine quarters ending in the third quarter of 2009, Fannie Mae lost a total of
$120.5 billion, and Freddie Mac lost $67.9 billion. Rebecca Christie & Jody Shenn, U.S. Treasury
Ends Cap on Fannie, Freddie Lifeline for 3 Years, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 25, 2009, http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2o6o'o7o&sid=aflZdeooJA6I.
115 Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Data as of December io, 2009 on Treasury and Federal Reserve
Purchase Programs for GSE and Mortgage-Related Securities, http://www.fifa.gov/webfiles/
153I5/TSYFedl2ioog.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2010) [hereinafter Fed. bous. Fin. Agency 2009
Data].
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"liquidity and stability in the secondary mortgage market."'1 6 Fannie
has sought to achieve this purpose by purchasing pools of mortgages
from banks and other lenders, placing the pools in trusts, and causing
the trusts to issue mortgage-backed securities whose performance Fan-
nie Mae guarantees. 17 These guarantees meant that the firm always
operated with large contingent debts. And the debts were correlated
with one another because - as was true of AIG's subprime-linked
credit default swaps - a nationwide housing slump would cause deep
liability on many of the debts to be triggered at the same time. Given
these correlated contingent debts, one might have expected Fannie
Mae to hedge itself on the asset side, investing in something unrelated
to housing. But the firm did the opposite, using the premiums it
earned on its guarantees, as well as cash it raised by issuing fixed debt,
to buy and hold even more mortgages and mortgage-backed securi-
ties. 18 As a result, Fannie was always anti-hedged, with large contin-
gent debts backed by assets whose value was tied to the same underly-
ing risks.
When housing prices began to fall in 2007, those correlated risks
materialized, and Fannie took losses. 119 The losses deepened in 2008
and continued into 2009, reaching a total of $121 billion over a nine-
quarter period.120 By comparison, Fannie's equity value at the end of
2006 was only $42 billion. 2 1 The company thus fell insolvent almost
three times over, and only a massive federal bailout could keep it from
defaulting on its debts. Federal regulators took control of the compa-
ny by placing it in conservatorship on September 6, 2008,122 and the
bailout spending started immediately thereafter. 23 That spending con-
tinued through the end of 2009, by which point the Treasury had in-
jected $60 billion directly into the company, and along with the Feder-
al Reserve had purchased another $789 billion in Fannie Mae fixed
debt and Fannie-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities. 24
How did Fannie Mae end up so far underwater? The correlated
risks across its balance sheet undoubtedly meant that the company
116 Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, Annual Report (Form io-K), at i (Feb. 26, 2009) [hereinafter
Fannie Mae 2008 io-K Report].
117 Id. at 15.
118 For example, at the end of 2007, mortgage-related assets constituted 82% of Fannie's total
assets. See id. at 81, 124 (noting total assets in 2007 of $879 billion, and total mortgage assets of
$723 billion). This figure is comparable to the 2000 proportion, which was go%. See Fed. Nat'l
Mortgage Ass'n, Annual Report (Form iO-K), at 20 (Mar. 31, 2003) (noting total assets in 20oo of
$675 billion, and a net mortgage portfolio of $6o8 billion).
119 Fannie Mae 2008 io-K Report, supra note 116, at 8o (noting net losses in 2007 of $2 billion).
120 Christie & Shenn, supra note 114.
121 Fannie Mae 2008 io-K Report, supra note i16, at 81.
122 Id. at 20-21.
123 Id. at 25.
124 Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency 2009 Data, supra note I15.
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was always a risky proposition, unlikely to survive any sustained na-
tionwide drop in housing prices. But the depth of the company's fail-
ure - and hence the scale of its bailout - has led commentators to
surmise that the firm must have engaged in reckless conduct during
the bubble years that exacerbated its collapse. For example, commen-
tators have argued that Fannie borrowed too much money, with its
borrowing costs reduced by implicit government guarantees on its var-
ious debt obligations. 125
The problem with a simple story of excess borrowing is that Fan-
nie's leverage did not in fact rise during the run-up to the crisis. At
the end of 2007, its debt-to-equity ratio was 19.126 While this was a
high figure compared to other financial institutions, 127 it nonetheless
marked a sharp decline from 2001, when the ratio was 34.128 There-
fore, a simple focus on leverage - the traditional metric of risk for
fixed debt - would have given observers no warning that Fannie Mae
was piling on risk during the height of the bubble.
Instead of focusing on debt levels, other commentators have
blamed Fannie's troubles on its holdings of subprime mortgage-
backed securities, 1 29 which rose from approximately $15 billion in 2004
to $74 billion in 2007.130 However, only a fraction - about 19% - of
Fannie's 2o08 losses can be attributed to its subprime investments. 131
125 See, e.g., Steve Forbes, In-credit-able!, FORBES, Dec. 28, 2009, at 15 (arguing that Fannie
and Freddie's "implicit government guarantees" enabled them to "borrow cheaply and leverage
up on a scale no private company could').
126 At the end of 2007, Fannie Mae's total liabilities were $835 billion, and its shareholder equi-
ty was $44 billion. Fannie Mae 2008 io-K Report, supra note 1i6, at 8i. Dividing the first num-
ber by the second gives a leverage ratio of ig.
127 See Peter Eavis, Fannie, Freddie May Have Further To Fall, WALL ST. J., Feb. 29, 2008, at
C2 (noting that Fannie's leverage ratio at the end of 2007 was "at a level far above that of other
financial institutions').
128 At the end of 2001, Fannie's total liabilities were $791 billion, and its shareholder equity
was $23 billion. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, Annual Report (Form io-K), at 63 (Dec. 6, 2006)
[hereinafter Fannie Mae 2004 io-K Report]. Dividing the first number by the second gives a leve-
rage ratio of 34.
129 E.g., Jody Shenn, Fannie, Freddie Subprime Spree May Add to Bailout, BLOOMBERG,
Sept. 22, 2oo8, http:/lwww.bloomberg.com/appslnews?pid=2o6oio9&sid=ayoKkt47a3s4; see also
Peter Eavis, Fannie and Freddie's Home Inequity, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2009, at Cio (asserting
that Fannie and Freddie played "a central role in the housing crash with their huge purchases of
dangerous Alt-A mortgages'); Forbes, supra note 125, at 15 (characterizing Fannie as "bingeing"
on subprime mortgages in the years prior to the 2008 crash).
130 See Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, Annual Report (Form io-K), at 93 (Feb. 27, 2008) (noting
that Fannie's total holdings of subprime and Alt-A mortgage-backed securities at the end of 2007
were $74 billion, of which $14 billion were of a pre-2005 vintage). As noted in note 92, supra,
subprime and Alt-A mortgages are lumped together for purposes of the analysis here.
131 Fannie lost $59 billion in 2oo8. Fannie Mae 2oo8 io-K Report, supra note 116, at 80. Of
this amount, $7 billion was attributable to reduced cash flows and defaults on subprime and Alt-
A securities in the company's investment portfolio. Id. at 103. In addition, the company lost ap-
proximately $4 billion on trades in mortgage-backed securities, most of which involved subprime
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And it must be remembered that the prime/subprime distinction is less
important to Fannie than to a firm like AIG, because Fannie was itself
the guarantor of prime mortgage-backed securities, and thus was ex-
posed to losses on both mortgage types. Therefore, the more relevant
metric is the total value of Fannie's mortgage-linked investment hold-
ings - prime plus subprime. And this amount in fact declined from
2004 to 2007.132
To understand the depth of Fannie's collapse, one must look not at
the firm's fixed debt levels or its subprime investments, but rather at
its contingent debts. And here the numbers are telling. Between 2002
and 2007, the value of outstanding mortgage-backed securities guaran-
teed by Fannie more than doubled, from $1.04 trillion to $2.12 tril-
lion.1 33 This stunning increase occurred despite the fact that the firm's
total asset value actually declined slightly over the same period.134 In
other words, each dollar of assets on Fannie's books was supporting
twice as much contingent debt in 2007 as it was in 2002. And while
Fannie's equity value did grow somewhat over the same period, that
growth was not nearly sufficient to keep pace with the increase in con-
tingent debt. While every dollar of equity supported $33 worth of con-
tingent debt in 2002, this figure rose to $48 by the end of 2007. 3 5 As a
result, Fannie's 2008 losses due to its contingent debts were $30 billion,
more than half its total losses for the year.136 Thus, Fannie's contin-
gent debts, rather than its subprime investments, were the millstone
that pulled the company underwater. 37
and Alt-A securities. See id. at 107. Thus, total losses on subprime and Alt-A securities were $i1
billion, or 19% of $59 billion.
132 Fannie's total mortgage portfolio was $917 billion in 2004, see Fannie Mae 2004 so-K Re-
port, supra note 128, at 63, and shrank to $728 billion in 2007, see Fannie Mae 2008 io-K Report,
supra note i16, at 81.
133 This figure is listed on Fannie's balance sheet as "Fannie Mae MBS held by third parties."
Fannie Mae 2008 io-K Report, supra note 1I6, at 81; Fannie Mae 2004 io-K Report, supra note
128, at 63.
134 Fannie's total assets were $9o5 billion in 2002, Fannie Mae 2004 io-K Report, supra note
128, at 63, slightly higher than the 2007 total of $879 billion, Fannie Mae 20o8 io-K Report, supra
note 1I6, at 81.
135 Fannie's equity value was $32 billion in 2002, Fannie Mae 2004 io-K Report, supra note
128, at 63, and $44 billion in 2007, Fannie Mae 2008 io-K Report, supra note 116, at 81. Dividing
the value of the outstanding Fannie mortgage-backed securities listed in the text by these amounts
provides the stated ratios.
136 See Fannie Mae 2008 so-K Report, supra note 116, at lO9 (noting credit-related expenses of
$3o billion, consisting of changes in loss reserves for guarantees on outstanding mortgage-backed
securities, losses due to purchases of loans from Fannie Mae trusts that were nonperforming, and
foreclosure expenses for these loans); id. at 8o (noting losses of $6o billion).
137 After the mortgage-linked contingent debts, the biggest source of losses for Fannie in 2008
was its derivatives positions, most of which involved interest rate swaps that were meant to hedge
against the risk to Fannie's mortgage investments of an increase in interest rates. These positions
cost the firm $15 billion. Id. at iO4-O6.
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Why did Fannie Mae double its contingent debt levels in just five
years, thereby ensuring that it would suffer catastrophic losses if the
housing market collapsed? The simplest answer is that this conduct
greatly increased the value of the company to its shareholders. As
previously noted, Fannie had an inherently rickety structure, with al-
most nothing in its investment portfolio to prop it up in case of a hous-
ing downturn. Moreover, even in 2002 the combined value of the
company's mortgage-linked assets and contingent debts was many
times greater than its equity value. Therefore, in 2002 - if not well
before - the company was unlikely to remain solvent under market
conditions that would trigger meaningful liability on its contingent
debts. The implication was that the company was at the tipping point
described earlier in section I.B.2. It could sell additional contingent
claims against itself without placing any further risk on its sharehold-
ers, who would be wiped out anyway if deep liability on those claims
was ever triggered. Thus, by taking on another $i billion in mortgage-
linked contingent debt, the firm's managers made a massive one-way
bet on behalf of shareholders, who stood to pocket the premiums if the
debt was not triggered but lose nothing if it was.
Given that the premiums from these additional mortgage-linked
guarantees were essentially free money to Fannie's shareholders, one
wonders why the company did not ramp up its contingent debt levels
even sooner. A plausible answer is that Fannie in fact always took on
as much contingent debt as it could, but that it was not until the hous-
ing bubble that both the supply of new mortgages and the demand for
mortgage-backed securities permitted such rapid growth in the com-
pany's contingent debt levels. 138 An aggravating factor may have been
that shareholders pressured Fannie's managers to boost earnings
after the company's stock price started sliding in 2004,139 which may
have made managers more willing to issue so many new securities so
quickly.
Media accounts that focus on fixed debt and subprime investments
do only a slightly better job explaining the collapse of Freddie Mac, a
firm that Congress created as the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Cor-
poration in 1970.140 Freddie Mac's official purpose is essentially the
same as Fannie Mae's, 141 and it has followed the same business model,
issuing mortgage-backed securities whose performance it guarantees
138 Of course, Fannie's willingness to expand its issuances of guaranteed mortgage-backed se-
curities may have itself contributed to the housing bubble.
139 See Shenn, supra note 129.
140 See Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., Annual Report (Form so-K), at 1 (Mar. 1i, 2009) [he-
reinafter Freddie Mac 2o08 io-K Report].
141 See id. (noting that Freddie's purpose is to provide "liquidity, stability and affordability to
the U.S. housing market').
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and purchasing mortgage assets for its own investment portfolio. 142
Like Fannie, Freddie entered federal conservatorship in 20o8, a year in
which it suffered losses of $5o billion, almost twice its equity value at
the end of 2007.' 4 3 Losses continued into 2009, bringing the compa-
ny's total losses to $68 billion since the middle of 2007. 4 4 And Fred-
die is like Fannie in that it has received an enormous bailout, which
through 2oo9 has totaled $57o billion in direct capital infusions plus
government purchases of its outstanding fixed debt and guaranteed
securities. 145
Even though Fannie and Freddie were essentially equals in 2007 in
terms of total asset value, 146 Freddie invested more than twice as
much in subprime mortgages. 1 47 Freddie is thus more deserving of al-
legations in the media that the mortgage giants were "binging" on sub-
prime assets before the financial crisis. 148 Nevertheless, Freddie's
subprime investments were only partly responsible for the firm's col-
lapse, accounting for just one-third of the firm's 2008 losses. 149 And
increased borrowing also cannot explain Freddie's demise: while Fred-
die's 2007 leverage ratio of 29 was high in absolute terms, it had in
fact declined from a level of 32 in 2001.150
Therefore, to understand Freddie's conduct during the peak hous-
ing years, one must look again to contingent debt levels. And there, as
with Fannie, we see essentially a doubling in face amounts, with the
value of outstanding mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by Fred-
142 Id. at I, 5.
143 Id. at 58 (noting a 2oo8 net loss of $5o.I billion and a 2007 equity value of $26.7 billion).
144 Christie & Shenn, supra note 114.
145 Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency 2oo9 Data, supra note 115.
146 Freddie's total assets were $794 billion at the end of 2007. Freddie Mac 2o8 io-K Report,
supra note 140, at 58. Fannie was ii% larger, with $879 billion in assets. Fannie Mae 2oo8 io-K
Report, supra note i i6, at 81.
147 At the end of 2007, Freddie held $153 billion in subprime securities, a total that includes
securities the company characterized as subprime, Alt-A, and MTA (which stands for Moving
Treasury Average, the index that determines the underlying mortgages' adjustable rate). See
Freddie Mac 2oo8 io-K Report, supra note 14o, at 93, 95. By contrast, Fannie held $74 billion in
subprime securities at that point, as described in note 130, supra.
148 Peter J. Wallison, The Price for Fannie and Freddie Keeps Going Up, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30,
2oo9, at AI7 (stating that Fannie and Freddie were "binging" on subprime and Alt-A mortgages
between 2005 and 2007); see also Forbes, supra note 125, at 15.
149 As noted in note 143, supra, Freddie lost $5o.1 billion in 2oo8. Of this, $16.6 billion was
from impairment of the value of the company's subprime portfolio. Freddie Mac 2oo8 io-K Re-
port, supra note 140, at 80.
1SO See id. at 58 (noting 2007 total liabilities, defined as total assets minus shareholders' equity,
of $768 billion, and shareholders' equity of $27 billion); see also FREDDIE MAC, 2oo5 INFORMA-
TION STATEMENT AND ANNUAL REPORT TO STOCKHOLDERS 19 (2oo6), available at
http://www.freddiemac.com/investors/ar/pdf/2005annualrpt.pdf (noting 2001 total liabilities of
$621 billion and shareholders' equity of $2o billion).
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die climbing from $729 billion in 2002 to $1.38 trillion in 2007.''
Such growth came about even though Freddie's equity value declined
during that period, which meant that each dollar of shareholder equity
had to bear more than twice as much contingent debt. 5 2 As a result,
once the housing market collapsed, the losses that Freddie suffered be-
cause of its mortgage-linked guarantees were greater than its losses on
its subprime investments.153
The fact that correlation-seeking sheds more light than convention-
al accounts on the failures of both Fannie and Freddie becomes espe-
cially apparent when one compares the total losses sustained by the
two firms. As was noted previously, Freddie invested twice as much
in subprime assets as Fannie did. And, even though the two firms had
comparable total asset values, Freddie's simple leverage ratio was sig-
nificantly higher than Fannie's: 29 as opposed to 19. Based on these
metrics, one would expect Freddie to be the firm that would suffer
deeper losses if the bottom ever fell out of the housing market. But
the opposite is the case: so far Fannie has lost almost twice as much as
Freddie, and has also soaked up $280 billion more in federal bailout
funds.154 This difference in outcomes makes sense only if we look past
subprime investments and fixed debts to observe that the face value of
Fannie's mortgage-linked guarantees exceeded Freddie's by more than
$700 billion at the end of 2007.5 s Why Freddie did not keep pace
with Fannie in this regard is unclear, although simple market con-
straints may have played a role. But in any event, the correlation-
seeking incentives described here suggest why both the firms were
willing to run up their contingent debts so steeply when the opportuni-
ty presented itself, and why such conduct produced such deep losses
when the correlated risks materialized. Indeed, because the firms op-
erated beyond the contingent debt tipping point, they provide an ex-
ample of correlation-seeking in its purest form, with the downside risk
151 Compare FREDDIE MAC, 2002 INFORMATION STATEMENT AND ANNUAL REPORT TO
STOCKHOLDERS 6 (2004) [hereinafter FREDDIE MAC, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT], available at
http://www.freddiemac.comlinvestorslar/pdf/2o02annualrpt.pdf, with Freddie Mac 2008 jo-K Re-
port, supra note 14o, at 127.
152 Freddie's 2002 shareholder equity value was $31.3 billion. FREDDIE MAC, 2002 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 151, at 27. As noted in note 143, supra, its 2007 equity value was $26.7
billion.
153 Freddie Mac's 2oo8 losses attributable to its mortgage-linked guarantees included a $16.4
billion increase in its provision for losses and $1.6 billion in losses on loans purchased from the
underlying mortgage pools. Freddie Mac 2o08 lo-K Report, supra note 14o, at 82-83. As noted
in note 149, supra, Freddie's losses on its subprime portfolio were $16.6 billion.
154 As noted previously, Fannie Mae so far has received $849 billion in bailout funds, see supra
p. 1192, and Freddie Mac has received $57o billion, see supra p. 1196.
155 As noted previously, Fannie had $2.12 trillion in contingent debt at the end of 2007, see su-
pra p. 1194, while Freddie had $1.38 trillion, see supra p. 1197.
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from additional contingent debt sales borne almost entirely by parties
other than the firms' shareholders.
III. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE LAW OF CONTINGENT DEBT
Despite the widespread use of contingent debt in the modern econ-
omy, lawmakers have ignored the distinct opportunism hazard it
presents. Legal rules for contingent debts take no account of correla-
tions, relying instead on principles designed for fixed debts. This is
true not only of the Obama Administration's regulatory proposals in
response to the 2008 financial crisis, but also of traditional creditor-
protection doctrines such as fraudulent transfer law. In both cases,
lawmakers need to shift the emphasis from face values to correlations
if legal rules are to neutralize the incentives that create the risk of
another AIG, Fannie Mae, or Freddie Mac-style collapse.
A. Federal Financial Regulation After the Crash
In the wake of the 2008 crisis, the Obama Administration has pro-
posed broadly expanding federal regulation of the financial sector.
New rules would require financial firms to operate with less leverage,
disclose more information about business risk, and pay their executives
more in equity and less in cash. In addition, the federal government
would acquire direct oversight of the market for financial derivatives.
Importantly, none of these proposals hits the correlation-seeking haz-
ard head-on. Some proposals - such as the leverage and disclosure
rules - address correlation-seeking only obliquely, and may impose
high compliance costs. And others - such as collateral requirements
for derivatives and new executive pay rules - may in fact make the
correlation-seeking hazard worse. As explained below, a better ap-
proach might be for lawmakers to remove obstacles that now prevent
or discourage market participants from monitoring each other to pre-
vent correlation-seeking directly.
i. Correlation Indistinct: The Administration's Regulatory Vision.
- Many of the administration's regulatory proposals for the financial
sector were laid out in a June 2009 Treasury Department report. 15 6
The most important of these proposals appear in a bill - the Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act15 7 - that the House of
Representatives passed in December 2009. Importantly, neither the
Treasury report nor the legislation derived from it takes direct account
of the correlated asset and debt risks that drove AIG, Fannie, and
156 See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 68.
157 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, iiith Cong. (as passed by
House of Representatives, Dec. Ii, 2oo9), available at http://financialservices.house.gov[Key-
Issues/Financial_RegulatoryReform/FinancialRegulatoryReform/i i i-hr.finsrv_417 3 _full.pdf.
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Freddie so deeply insolvent. For example, the report states that "ex-
cessive risk taking" at AIG was a leading cause of the financial cri-
sis,l' 8 and it cites the company's conduct as a primary justification for
federal regulation of derivatives. 159 But the report does not recognize
that AIG was broadly exposed to the subprime market on both sides of
its balance sheet, concluding instead that the company imploded be-
cause it was "overwhelmed" by the "sheer volume" of its credit default
swap liabilities. 160 Unsurprisingly, the House bill's provisions for de-
rivatives invite officials to regulate contracts based primarily on their
notional amounts, as if the contingent debt problem were indistinct
from a problem of excess leverage more generally.161
Perhaps the most far-reaching of the measures in the House bill are
leverage caps that would require financial firms to issue less debt rela-
tive to their equity values. 62 Minimum capital requirements of this
type have obvious appeal in the aftermath of 2008, as a decrease in a
firm's debt-to-equity ratio makes the firm's insolvency less likely. But
the bill also enables regulators to raise capital requirements even high-
er on firms that trade in derivatives. 63 And leverage requirements
specific to derivative users seem harder to justify, as they could burden
even firms whose derivative-based contingent debts lack positive in-
ternal correlations and thus do not increase insolvency risk or other-
wise present a meaningful opportunism hazard. In other words, the
bill invites regulators to adopt a sledgehammer approach, effectively
taxing derivatives across the board rather than targeting those that are
most likely to create systemic risk or otherwise reduce social wealth.
The House bill would also require derivative users to disclose more
information about their trading positions, with data to be collected
through regulated exchanges.' 64 As with stricter leverage require-
158 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 68, at 47.
159 Id.
160 Id. In this way, the section on derivatives is analytically no different from the report's ear-
lier sections that blame the collapse of large bank holding companies on problems of "excess lever-
age." See id. at 29.
161 No variant on the word "correlation" appears in the section of the bill that addresses deriva-
tives, and two of that section's most important provisions - those involving capital and margin
requirements - could be set based entirely on notional amounts, at the discretion of regulators.
The closest that the section on derivatives seems to come to addressing risk correlations are its
provisions that permit regulators to impose position limits on individual parties. But the bill does
not direct regulators to take risk correlations into account when setting limits, and instead seems
concerned primarily with positions that might interfere with price discovery. H.R. 4173 §§ 3113,
3203.
162 Id. §§ 1103-04.
163 Id. §§ 3107, 3204; see also TREASURY REPORT, supra note 68, at 48 (identifying stricter
counterparty capital requirements as a regulatory goal).
164 See H.R. 473 §§ 3103-31o6, 3204. Because of exemptions contained in the bill, only about
half of all derivative contracts would need to be exchange-traded. See Randall Smith & Sarah N.
Lynch, How Overhauling Derivatives Died, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26-27, 2009, at Bi.
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ments, this proposal could have nominal benefits. For example, re-
quired disclosures may make it cheaper for creditors to monitor deb-
tors and ferret out opportunism. It is not obvious, however, that a
lack of relevant information was a primary cause of the financial cri-
sis. For example, AIG's 2007 annual report contained detailed infor-
mation about the company's swap positions and about the type, face
value, vintage, and credit rating of the mortgage-backed securities that
the company owned. 16  Yet insurance regulators did nothing to force
AIG to mitigate its housing market exposure before the crisis. In other
words, the financial crisis seems to have been caused not primarily by
a lack of information about risk, but rather by a lack of motivation
among those with information to act on it. And disclosure require-
ments impose direct costs, especially if they become a basis for private
lawsuits alleging that disclosures are incomplete or misleading. There-
fore, heightened disclosure rules may be another example of a measure
that raises costs across the board but fails to reach the root of the
problem.
The House bill's third major requirement for derivative contracts is
potentially the most problematic. The bill would enable regulators to
impose "margin" requirements, meaning that counterparties would
have to post more collateral than their contracts would otherwise re-
quire. 66 The idea is to insulate each counterparty from the risk that
the other will fall insolvent, thereby preventing the type of contagion
in a financial crisis that is the essence of systemic risk. In this way, the
proposal implies that the financial crisis was primarily a crisis of illi-
quidity - for example, that AIG could have survived without a gov-
ernment bailout if it had only posted more collateral when it first en-
tered into its swap contracts. But the truth is that AIG was not just
illiquid but also insolvent, with losses in 2008 that exceeded the com-
pany's 2007 equity value.1 67  Therefore, more collateral for AIG's
counterparties would simply have meant deeper losses for its other
creditors - including other financial firms - in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. Put more generally, financial intermediaries are thought to
create systemic risk because they are interconnected, with multiple
debt obligations and other contractual arrangements among them. It
therefore seems doubtful that the systemic damage caused by the fail-
ure of one such firm could be stemmed by shifting losses from some
contract types to others.
Indeed, rather than contain systemic risk, higher margin require-
ments may in fact exacerbate it. As was noted previously, the special
165 AIG 2007 io-K Report, supra note 76, at 104-05, 121-23.
166 See HR. 4173 §§ 3107, 3204.
167 See supra note 97.
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Bankruptcy Code exemptions for derivatives make counterparties de
facto secured creditors by giving them the first claim to posted collat-
eral.168 And this priority reduces the need for counterparties to moni-
tor each other because it shifts insolvency risk onto other unsecured
creditors. However, to the extent that counterparties start out under-
secured, with the expectation that more collateral will have to be post-
ed if risk levels increase, the parties have some reason to keep an eye
on each other over the life of the contract. It follows that margin re-
quirements that force parties to post more collateral up front will fur-
ther reduce their incentive to be vigilant after the contract is signed,
thereby making correlation-seeking - and hence financial distress -
more likely. And this result would be especially perverse given that
the relative sophistication of derivative counterparties, most of which
are financial institutions, would make them better monitors than the
typical unsecured creditor.
When considered in the context of the financial system as a whole,
higher margin requirements can be seen as introducing conflict be-
tween two related regulatory goals. The first goal is to prevent indi-
vidual financial institutions from taking on excessive business risk that
might cause them to fail. And the second goal is to quarantine those
firms that (despite regulators' best efforts) fail anyway, thereby pre-
venting insolvent firms from infecting otherwise healthy counterpar-
ties. Strict margin rules advance the second goal at the expense of the
first, because they insulate select creditors from losses caused by corre-
lation-seeking, thus making correlation-seeking more likely. For this
reason, margin rules are inferior to reforms such as minimum capital
requirements, which reduce the risk both that an "index patient" will
succumb and, if one does, that the infirmity will spread.
The other important component of the administration's regulatory
vision is found not in proposed legislation, but rather in the executive
pay policies adopted by the Treasury Department's "pay czar." Al-
though the pay czar has formal jurisdiction over only a handful of
bailout recipients such as AIG and General Motors, the Obama Ad-
ministration has expressed a hope that other firms will treat his ap-
proach as a "best practice" that they too should follow.' 69 And several
firms have in fact already done so, perhaps to try to stave off more ag-
gressive regulation.1Y 0 The Federal Reserve, in turn, has proposed pay
168 See supra pp. i187-88.
169 See Deborah Solomon, Pay Czar Targets Salary Cuts, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2009, at Ax (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
170 Deborah Solomon, Firms Back Plan To Change Pay Policies, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2009, at
A3 ; see also Aaron Lucchetti, Morgan Stanley To Overhaul Pay Plan, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2009,
at Ci (noting that Morgan Stanley has adopted a pay policy that increases the degree to which
senior executives will be paid in deferred stock).
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guidelines that would apply to all banking organizations 7 ' and that
suggest in places an approach to executive compensation potentially
similar to that of the pay czar. Importantly, that approach is based on
a theory of management misconduct that is in tension with the oppor-
tunism story told here.
The administration has sought to regulate executive pay according
to two general principles. The first is that senior executives should
take more of their compensation in the form of equity rather than
cash. 17 2 And the second is that executives should be forced to hold on
to their equity in the company for several years.' 7 3  In combination,
these principles suggest that the administration is mainly worried
about conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, and in
particular that managers too often pursue short-term gain at the ex-
pense of long-term shareholder value.' 7 4 But the evidence from AIG,
Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac tells a different story. In those firms,
the apparent problem was not that managers failed to serve sharehold-
ers, but rather that they served them too well, seeking to enrich them
at the expense of creditors and taxpayers. The fact that these firms'
shareholders eventually took huge losses does not mean that the man-
agers' decisions were contrary to shareholder interests given the in-
formation available at the time. Moreover, correlation-seeking is not a
game in which managers play the short term against the long term.
Rather, it is a stratagem in which managers play the interests of share-
holders against the interests of creditors over essentially the same time
horizon. By forcing executives to take more of their pay in equity and
less in cash, the administration's policies align managers even more
closely with shareholders against creditors, thereby making correla-
tion-seeking more likely.17 5
171 In particular, the Federal Reserve's pay rules would bind U.S. bank holding companies,
state member banks, and the U.S. operations of foreign banks, among others. See Proposed
Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,227, 5 5 ,22 8 n.i (Oct. 27,
2009) [hereinafter Proposed Guidance].
172 See Solomon, supra note 169 ("Instead of awarding large cash salaries, [the pay czar] is
planning to shift a chunk of an employee's annual salary into stock that cannot be touched for
several years. . ... "); see also Proposed Guidance, supra note IM7, at 55,234 (indicating that bank-
ing organizations can comply with guidelines on management risk-taking incentives by paying
senior executives "deferred incentive compensation in equity (such as restricted stock of the organ-
ization) or equity-based instruments (such as options to acquire the organization's stock)').
173 See sources cited supra note 172.
174 See, e.g., Proposed Guidance, supra note 171, at 55,232 (expressing concern with compensa-
tion that focuses on short-term revenues or profits because "[a]ctivities that carry higher risk typi-
cally yield higher short-term revenue").
175 Other scholars have also observed that paying bank executives in equity may induce banks
to take risks that are excessive from a social perspective. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spa-
mann, Regulating Bankers' Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 256 (2010).
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In fact, the administration's pay policies would cause senior execu-
tives to benefit even more from correlation-seeking than many of their
shareholders do. This is because many shareholders diversify their in-
vestments across public companies, which blunts their personal bene-
fits from correlation-seeking in two ways. First, diversification re-
duces the net wealth gain to the shareholder from correlation-seeking
by making it more likely that the shareholder will own the firms on
both sides of the wealth transfer. And second, diversification tempers
investment volatility, thereby reducing the need for loyal managers to
take equity volatility into account when deciding which assets to buy
or contingent debts to incur. But diversification is an option denied to
executives who are forced to hold a large, locked-in equity stake in a
single firm. And concentrated shareholders of this type benefit most
from wealth transfers to their particular firm's advantage, and from
firm-specific reductions in equity volatility, both of which are conse-
quences of correlation-seeking. For this reason, the administration's
pay policies may introduce a type of conflict between managers and
public shareholders that further exacerbates the correlation-seeking
hazard.
2. A Better Approach: Helping Creditors Help Themselves. - In
light of these drawbacks to the administration's proposed financial sec-
tor reforms, a better approach might be for lawmakers to remove legal
impediments that now discourage creditors from punishing opportun-
ism directly. The most important of these impediments are the special
bankruptcy exemptions for derivative counterparties. The ostensible
purpose of these exemptions is to reduce systemic risk by preventing
the bankruptcy of one firm from destabilizing counterparties that are
financial intermediaries. 17 6 However, as argued above, it is implausi-
ble that systemic risk can be curtailed merely by shifting losses around
among contract types. Moreover, the exemptions magnify the oppor-
tunism hazard created by derivatives because the wealth transfer pro-
duced by a contingent debt increases when the claimant has priority
over other creditors. 7 7 Reinstating bankruptcy's automatic stay and
its prohibitions on preferences and ipso facto clauses would shrink
wealth transfers by relegating derivative counterparties to the status of
ordinary unsecured creditors. This change would also make counter-
parties more vulnerable to correlation-seeking, thereby encouraging
them to monitor in order to prevent it. For example, if AIG's sophisti-
cated swap buyers had been more exposed to the risk that AIG would
176 Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why
the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 97-99 (2005).
177 See supra pp. 1174-75.
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fail, they might have tried to prevent the company from reallocating so
much of its investment portfolio into risky mortgage-backed assets.
Lawmakers should also encourage creditor monitoring by reform-
ing common law creditor-protection doctrines to reflect the distinct
opportunism hazard presented by contingent debt. For example, an
effective fraudulent transfer doctrine would penalize contingent claim-
ants when correlation-seeking is apparent, thereby encouraging the
claimants themselves to avoid contingent debt contracts with high in-
ternal correlations. 7 8 In addition, regulators might require rating
agencies to issue reports that reflect not only the probability that an
individual debt instrument will default, but also the instrument's di-
versification value - that is, the correlation between the instrument's
default risk and the risks on other important categories of investment
products. Such ratings would permit creditors to write loan covenants
that refer to publicly available measures of diversification, creating a
cheap mechanism for enforcing contractual limitations on internal cor-
relation levels.
Besides the bankruptcy exemptions for derivatives, another policy
that lawmakers should revisit is the administration's executive pay
guidelines. By insisting that senior managers hold long-term equity
positions, these guidelines only aggravate shareholder-creditor conflict.
Lawmakers instead should be more tolerant of executives' natural pre-
ference for cash-based compensation, at least in financial intermediar-
ies. Or, if "short-termism" remains a perceived problem (albeit a prob-
lem distinct from correlation-seeking), lawmakers might require
executives in systemically important firms to take some of their pay in
the form of restricted firm debt.
Of course, any effort to make creditors - including, potentially,
managers themselves - more watchful will be in vain if the creditors
expect the government to bail them out when their debtor defaults. It
follows that the correlation-seeking hazard is at its zenith when credi-
tors are confident that they will recover in full, with taxpayers rather
than creditors suffering the expected wealth transfers, and the econo-
my as a whole bearing the social costs. It therefore is essential that
regulators create an environment in which creditors bear default risk.
In this respect, there seems to be little reason for the government to
bail out the general, fixed-claim creditors of government-sponsored
entities such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, even if the government
continues to ensure the performance of the mortgage-backed securities
those firms issue. 1 79
178 See infra section IH.B, pp. 1205-12.
179 While the future form of government-sponsored mortgage firms remains unclear, the federal
government appears likely to retain at least some role in the underwriting of residential mort-
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To the extent, however, that creditors will inevitably regard at least
some firms as "too big to fail," regulators may have to target correla-
tion-seeking directly. In the cases of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
this presumably would mean much tighter limits on the ratio of out-
standing mortgage guarantees to firm equity value. And in systemical-
ly important firms generally, regulators might consider bright-line pro-
hibitions on sales of contingent debt contracts that constitute "end of
the world" insurance, meaning insurance that is likely to be triggered
only in a severe economic downturn that impairs multiple asset classes.
Because the downside risk on such contracts cannot easily be hedged,
it is unlikely to be borne by shareholders of firms with meaningful
debt levels, thereby creating large expected wealth transfers away from
unsecured creditors and taxpayers. A prominent example of such in-
surance is credit default swaps on U.S. Treasury bonds, the market for
which has swelled in recent years. These swaps tend to sell at a dis-
count precisely because, as economist Jeffrey Hummel has observed,
the U.S. government is likely to default on its debts only under the sort
of dire economic conditions that would tend to bankrupt the swap sel-
lers as well.180 Regulators should consider permitting derivatives of
this type to be sold only by entities that lack significant debt, and thus
cannot readily use the contracts to expropriate wealth through correla-
tion-seeking.
B. Correlation and Fraudulent Transfer Law
Like current regulatory proposals, traditional creditor-protection
doctrines also neglect correlation-seeking. This is a shame, because the
most important of these doctrines, fraudulent transfer law, provides a
powerful equitable remedy in a setting where contractual remedies of-
ten are inadequate to deter opportunism. That remedy is subordina-
tion of a claim against a debtor that otherwise would tend to expro-
priate wealth from the debtor's unsecured creditors. Applied properly,
subordination could negate the correlation-seeking incentive by cancel-
ing the wealth transfer away from the debtor's unsecured creditors.
Alas, fraudulent transfer doctrine is currently unsuitable for deter-
ring correlation-seeking. Courts analyze fraudulent transfer challenges
to contingent debts under the same principles they use for challenges
to fixed debts, producing rulings that bear no meaningful relationship
to the actual opportunism hazard. Fortunately, fraudulent transfer
gage-backed securities. See Nick Timiraos, Support Grows for Fan-Fred Plan, WALL ST. J., Dec.
14, 2009, at A7.
180 Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, Why Default on U.S. Treasuries Is Likely, LIBR. EcON. & LIBER-
TY, Aug. 3, 2009, http://www.econlib.orgllibrary/Columns/y2oogfHummeltbills.html.
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rules for contingent debt that focus on correlations could be fashioned
within the existing statutory framework. This section explains how.
Originally, fraudulent transfer law prohibited only "actual" fraud
- meaning debtor conduct that demonstrably was intended to harm
creditors.' 8 1 But modern fraudulent transfer statutes also grant relief
from certain debtor conduct that is objectively likely to make creditors
worse off, known as "constructive" fraud. To establish constructive
fraud, a litigant must satisfy two elements. First, the litigant must
show that the debtor gave away assets or incurred a debt without re-
ceiving "reasonably equivalent value" in exchange. 182 And second, the
litigant must show that the challenged transaction occurred under cir-
cumstances in which opportunism was especially likely. 83  Litigants
have a few statutory options for fulfilling this second element; by far
the most popular is to show that the debtor was insolvent when the
transaction occurred. 84
When the alleged fraud involves a simple purchase or sale, the
"reasonably equivalent value" question is straightforward: did the deb-
tor give away assets worth about as much as those the debtor got in
return? If the answer is no, the transaction reduced the debtor's net
worth, making creditors worse off. When the alleged fraud involves a
debt contract, however, the analysis is a bit more complicated. What
exactly is the "reasonably equivalent value" of a debt? Although
courts have differed on this question, the majority approach today em-
ploys something akin to a simple expected value calculation. 185 In
other words, the court estimates the forward-looking probability that
the debt will come due, and multiplies this by the debt's face value. If
the product is comparable to the value of the assets the debtor re-
ceived for incurring the debt, the court holds that reasonably equiva-
lent value was provided.186
This expected value approach makes good sense when used to de-
ter misuse of fixed debts. To see why, consider again the $25 fixed
debt from Figure 2. That figure assumed that Claimant was willing to
181 See ii U.S.C. § 548(a)(I)(A) (2oo6) (incorporating a prohibition on actual fraudulent trans-
fers into federal bankruptcy law); Robert A. Fogelson, Toward a Rational Treatment of Fraudulent
Conveyance Cases Involving Leveraged Buyouts, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 552, 555 (993) (indicating
that the original fraudulent conveyance statute, the Statute of Elizabeth, prohibited only actual
fraud).
182 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(I)(B)(i); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §§ 4(a)(2), 5(a), 7A
U.L.A. pt. 2, at 58, 129 (2006). Under the older Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, which is
still in effect in some states, a "fair consideration" test stands in for the "reasonably equivalent
value" requirement. Id. § 4 cmt. 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
183 See ii U.S.C. § 548(a)(I)(B)(ii).
184 See id. § 548(aXi)(B)(iiXI).
185 The most influential decision in this line of cases was written by Judge Richard Posner. See
In re Xonics Photochemical, Inc., 841 F.2d 198 (7 th Cir. 1988).
186 See id. at 200.
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pay Debtor an up-front amount equal to her expected recovery on her
claim, which is the maximum amount a rational, risk-neutral party in
Claimant's position would pay. Given the other assumptions used for
Figure 2, that amount was $24.29. And, as the figure showed, this ar-
rangement increased Unsecured Creditor's expected losses by 13%.
How much worse off would Unsecured Creditor be if we assumed in-
stead that Debtor simply gave away the $25 fixed claim for free? In
that case, the increase in Unsecured Creditor's expected losses would
more than quadruple, to 6o%.187 The implication is that a fraudulent
transfer doctrine that requires claimants to pay the expected value of
their claims does in fact greatly reduce the opportunism hazard pre-
sented by fixed obligations.
Matters change considerably, however, when we apply the same
approach to contingent debts, as Figure 4 illustrates.
FIGURE 4. CONTINGENT DEBT WEALTH TRANSFER:






Creditor 30% --- No





-0.2 0.0 0.2 0-4 o.6 o.8 I.0
Internal Correlation on Contingent Debt
Note: contingency and downturn risks are 1o% each
The figure reflects the same assumptions that were used for Figure 2.
The line labeled "Maximum Premium" shows the wealth transfer away
from Unsecured Creditor when Claimant pays a premium equal to her
expected recovery on her claim - which, as noted, is the largest
amount she rationally would pay.188 And the "No Premium" line
shows the opposite extreme, where Debtor incurs the contingent debt
but receives nothing from Claimant in return.
The figure shows that the "reasonably equivalent value" require-
ment as courts now interpret it serves essentially no useful function
187 This result is calculated by taking equation (3) in note 22, supra, and setting P equal to $o.
188 This line is thus identical to the contingent debt line in Figure 2.
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when applied to a contingent debt. By forcing claimants to pay the
simple expected value of their claims, that requirement in effect tries
to reduce unsecured creditors losses by the distance between the "No
Premium" line and the "Maximum Premium" line. But this distance is
trivial, a mere 3% to 6% in terms of Unsecured Creditor's baseline
loss. By contrast, recall that the same approach made a 47 percentage-
point difference in terms of Unsecured Creditor's expected losses when
the claim was fixed. Thus, relative to the other factors that determine
the contingent debt's impact on Unsecured Creditor, we see that the
question whether Claimant pays a premium at all - let alone the
maximum premium she would pay - is almost entirely irrelevant.
What really matters is the internal correlation, which as it swings from
zero to perfect in Figure 4 increases Unsecured Creditor's expected
losses by more than 50 %.18 9
Figure 4 also shows that current doctrine decides cases in a manner
that makes big mistakes in both directions. The claim at the upper
right endpoint of the Maximum Premium line represents a huge oppor-
tunism risk, since it increases Unsecured Creditor's expected losses by
57%. But a court would hold that the claim satisfies the "reasonably
equivalent value" test because Claimant paid a premium equal to her
full expected recovery on it. Conversely, the claim at the lower left
endpoint of the No Premium line has no expected economic impact on
Unsecured Creditor at all. And yet a court might very well deem that
claim fraudulent because Debtor gave it away for free.
These illogical results stem from current doctrine's failure to define
"reasonably equivalent value" from the perspective of the parties that
fraudulent transfer law is supposed to protect: unsecured creditors.
The simple expected value test that courts now use essentially adopts
the viewpoint of the contingent claimant, and asks whether she paid a
premium approximating her claim's value to her. For example, Claim-
ant is willing to pay $1.52 for the perfectly correlated $25 contingent
claim depicted in Figure 4. And, as noted, a court would probably
find that this premium qualifies as reasonably equivalent value, be-
cause it reflects the claim's simple expected value. (If alternatively the
court adopted the perspective of Shareholders, the premium would
seem more than reasonable, because the claim imposes no downside
risk on them at all.) But $1.52 is grossly inadequate from the perspec-
tive of Unsecured Creditor. Due to the liability's high internal correla-
tion, the premium would have to be $31.25 to neutralize the debt's
189 The question whether Claimant pays in full becomes even less important as the risk of the
triggering event decreases. For example, if we were to assume in Figure 4 that the contingency
and downturn risks were each i% rather than io%, the correlation level would still make more
than a 5o% difference in terms of Unsecured Creditor's expected losses. But the difference made
by the premium would shrink to less than i%.
12o8 [VOL. 123:1151
HeinOnline  -- 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1208 2009-2010
SHAREHOLDER OPPORTUNISM
negative impact on Unsecured Creditor ' 90 - more than twenty times
the maximum premium that Claimant would pay.
The magnitude of this shortfall suggests that courts should not
waste time and litigation costs trying to determine how much a claim-
ant actually paid for a contingent debt. The difference between the
maximum and minimum amounts the claimant could have paid is of
essentially no consequence to the debtor's unsecured creditors. In-
stead, courts should look at the factor that actually drives the scale of
the wealth transfer: the internal correlation. And, because the purpose
of fraudulent transfer law is to deter opportunism, courts should focus
specifically on the correlation that would have been evident to an in-
formed claimant when the debt was incurred. When that correlation
is low, the court can be confident that the debt contract imposed at
most a minor expected loss on the unsecured creditors, even if the deb-
tor gave away the debt for free. Such a contract presents no opportun-
ism hazard and should be enforced in full. But when the internal cor-
relation is high, a court knows that the contract produced a large
expected transfer, even if the debtor managed to bargain for the largest
possible premium the claimant would have paid. Such a contract
therefore should automatically be deemed to fail the "reasonably
equivalent value" requirement.
Unfortunately, the second element of most constructive fraudulent
transfer challenges to contingent debts performs no better than the
first. As noted above, litigants usually try to satisfy the second ele-
ment by showing that the debtor was insolvent when the debt was in-
curred.1 91 The intuition behind the insolvency requirement is that a
firm's managers are most likely to give away the firm's assets -
through outright gifts or one-sided "loans" - when the shareholders
have no remaining economic stake in the firm.
While the logic behind the insolvency requirement seems plausible
when a debt is ioo% certain to come due, it breaks down when the ob-
ligation to pay is contingent upon a future event that is correlated with
the firm's insolvency risk. In that case, the firm does not have to be
insolvent now for its managers to anticipate that it will be if the liabili-
ty ever comes due. Therefore, a fraudulent transfer doctrine that ap-
plies an insolvency requirement to contingent debts will be badly un-
derinclusive, missing many instances in which the opportunism hazard
arises. This conclusion is borne out by Figures 2 and 3, which show
contingent debts that can produce large expected wealth transfers even
190 This result is calculated by taking equation (4) in note 22, supra, setting T equal to $o, and
solving for P.
191 See ii U.S.C. § 548(a)(iXBXii)(I) (2006); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5(a), 7A
U.L.A. pt. 2, at 129 (2006).
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though both figures assume that Debtor is solvent when the debts are
incurred.
Fortunately, there are statutory alternatives to the insolvency re-
quirement. In particular, a litigant can prevail by showing instead
that the debtor "intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would
incur, debts that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such
debts matured."'192 This alternative is rarely used, 193 presumably be-
cause litigants believe that it is hard to prove that a debtor intended to
default. But a high internal correlation that was conspicuous when a
contingent debt was incurred provides exactly such proof. Thus, if a
debtor knew, or reasonably should have known, 194 that a contingent
debt was highly correlated with the debtor's insolvency risk, then the
debtor certainly incurred a debt that it could foresee would be beyond
its ability to pay as the debt matured. 195 This alternative to the insol-
vency requirement means that litigants in theory could use evidence of
a high internal correlation to satisfy both elements of a constructive
fraudulent transfer claim. And it means that courts could have an ef-
fective method for policing correlation-seeking that conforms with
fraudulent transfer statutes as they are now written.
How would courts estimate the internal correlation that would
have been evident to an informed observer when a contingent debt
was incurred? Although a complete answer to this question requires
further scholarship, a few factors that might serve as reliable indica-
tors of positive internal correlations can be identified here. First, the
contingent liability created by a guarantee contract will almost invari-
ably have a high internal correlation if the guarantor and borrower are
under common control - meaning that they are part of the same cor-
porate group, or the guarantor is a shareholder who has personally
guaranteed the debt of a closely held corporation. In those arrange-
ments, the fortunes of borrower and guarantor tend to be tightly
192 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(i)(B)(ii)(II); accord UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(2)(ii),
7A U.L.A. pt. 2, at 58 (employing an essentially identical test).
193 See Asarco LLC v. Ams. Mining Corp., 396 B.R. 278, 399 n.i4o (S.D. Tex. 2008) (noting
that courts have had little opportunity to interpret the provision).
194 Although the statutory language suggests a subjective intent requirement, courts have held
that the requirement can be satisfied upon a showing that "the debtor could not have reasonably
believed that it would be able to pay its debts as they matured." WRT Creditors Liquidation
TIrust v. WRT Bankr. Litig. Master File (In re WRT Energy Corp.), 282 B.R. 343, 415 (Bankr.
W.D. La. 2001).
195 In the typical fact pattern, the challenged transaction is a conveyance of assets rather than
the incurrence of an obligation, and the question is whether the conveyance was fraudulent with
respect to subsequent creditors. See, e.g., Asarco, 396 B.R. at 400. Courts have, however, deemed
an obligation to be fraudulent when the obligation itself is the debt that the debtor did not intend
to be able to repay. See, e.g., Pajaro Dunes Rental Agency, Inc. v. Spitters (In re Pajaro Dunes
Rental Agency, Inc.), 174 B.R. 557, 593-94 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994) (applying the corresponding
provision in California's fraudulent transfer statute).
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linked, either because the two produce the same economic outputs, or
because one owns a large equity stake in the other.
More broadly, contingent liabilities tend to have high internal cor-
relations when the debtor is in the same industry as the firm or asset
whose performance risk is the subject of the contingency. For exam-
ple, stock prices for firms in the same industry are more correlated
than stock prices generally. 196 Courts therefore might adopt a pre-
sumption that a claim on a put option is to be subordinated whenever
the writer of the option is in the same industry as the issuer of the ref-
erence stock. And the same rule would apply to a credit default swap
on a bond when the swap seller is in the same industry as the bond
issuer.
Finally, the most reliable indicator of a positive internal correlation
is a face value that is greater than the debtor's equity value when the
debt was incurred. As Figure 3 illustrated, contingent debts of this
type always produce large expected wealth transfers, implying that
they should always be subordinated.1 97 For the same reason, a debt
should be subordinated if its face value combined with the value of
other contingent debts already on the debtor's books exceeded the
debtor's equity and the triggers on those debts were themselves highly
correlated.
A potential objection to the fraudulent transfer doctrine proposed
here is that it is subject to hindsight bias. By necessity, fraudulent
transfer challenges to contingent debts are brought only when the debt
has in fact been triggered against an insolvent debtor, making this
eventuality seem much more likely than it would have originally ap-
peared to an informed observer. But hindsight bias is a pitfall of any
fraudulent transfer doctrine that tries to analyze conditions when a
debt was incurred rather than after it has come due. Moreover, ques-
tions of correlation will usually be less speculative than the expected
value questions that courts now ask. For example, reasonable minds
could have disagreed in 2005 about the probability that liability on
AIG's mortgage-linked swaps would be triggered. And yet the answer
to that question would be an essential ingredient of an expected value
calculation. By contrast, there could have been far less doubt that, if
deep liability on AIG's swaps was triggered, then AIG's own subprime
mortgage-backed securities would also have plummeted in value.
This example suggests that estimating whether two future events are
correlated is often easier than estimating each event's independent
probability. And, as the previous discussion suggested, a correlation-
196 Chan et al., supra note 37, at 943.
197 For claims that create a range of possible liability amounts, courts could treat the expected
mean, or perhaps the mean plus a standard deviation, as the relevant point for determining
whether to subordinate.
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based doctrine could use bright-line rules such as whether assets are
employed in the same industry or under common control. Therefore, a
correlation-based fraudulent transfer approach to contingent debt
would be easier than current doctrine to apply, while at the same
time producing results better targeted toward the actual opportunism
hazard.
A second potential objection to the approach proposed here is that
it would not deter reverse correlation-seeking. The proposed approach
looks only at the internal correlation when the contingent debt was in-
curred, rather than also considering subsequent debtor conduct that
might have increased that correlation. But subordinating a contingent
debt in response to reverse correlation-seeking would make little sense,
because reverse correlation-seeking harms the contingent claimant
along with the rest of the debtor's unsecured creditors. Importantly,
this limitation of the proposed approach is not a reason to prefer cur-
rent fraudulent transfer doctrine, which also does nothing to prevent
reverse correlation-seeking. The limitation does, however, suggest that
an effective legal response to correlation-seeking must include multiple
components, combining reform of fraudulent transfer doctrine with,
for example, measures that would make it cheaper for creditors to
monitor in order to prevent correlation-seeking in each of its forms.
CONCLUSION
The recent financial crisis demonstrated that the law has failed to
keep pace with the expanding role of contingent debt in the modern
economy. Legal rules meant to prevent abuse of debt were designed
for a world of fixed obligations such as simple loans and bonds. These
rules naturally focus on a debt's face value, and they assume that op-
portunism is most likely when a firm is already insolvent and share-
holders therefore no longer care that higher leverage means higher vol-
atility. With contingent debt, however, there is a variable that matters
just as much as the face value: the correlation between the contingency
risk and the debtor's insolvency risk. And conduct that increases this
correlation - a form of opportunism that this Article has termed cor-
relation-seeking - often reduces equity volatility as it increases share-
holder returns, making it a hazard even in firms that are fully solvent.
If rules suitable for contingent debt had been in place before 2008, the
financial crisis might not have been as severe. And AIG, Fannie Mae,
and Freddie Mac certainly would not have needed so much govern-
ment money to stay afloat.
This Article has identified several ways for lawmakers to start
catching up to the correlation-seeking hazard. In the financial mar-
kets, obstacles to creditor monitoring should be cleared, and regulators
should reconsider executive pay rules that exacerbate shareholder-
creditor conflict by encouraging managers to hold locked-in equity po-
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sitions. But these would only be first steps. Lawmakers need empiri-
cal research in order to target correlation-seeking aggressively without
unduly burdening socially beneficial uses of contingent debt. For ex-
ample, more data is needed to identify which variables - such as
industry, market sector, and ownership structure - best predict high
internal correlations. To tailor rules to contract types, separate data is
required for correlations between equity values and insolvency risk
(which would predict misuse of put options), and between insolvency
risk across firms (predicting misuse of credit default swaps). In addi-
tion, regulators charged with curbing systemic risk would benefit from
information on how prices for contingent debt contracts vary depend-
ing on the seller's debt structure. Such information could flag those
contracts that are being subsidized by large value transfers away from
the seller's unsecured creditors - or, if the seller is a likely bailout re-
cipient, taxpayers. Not only could such data reveal firm-specific corre-
lation-seeking, but it also could identify an increase in systemic risk
before it manifests in another crash.
Although this Article's focus has been on relatively "exotic" contin-
gent debt contracts such as credit default swaps, more traditional ar-
rangements may be no less subject to opportunism. Indeed, the most
pervasive ongoing source of correlation-seeking in the modern econo-
my may be guarantees on corporate debt where the guarantor and
borrower are part of the same corporate group (an "intragroup" guar-
antee) or the guarantor is the borrower's controlling shareholder.
These arrangements are extremely prevalent, and correlation-seeking
helps explain why. The fortunes of a guarantor and a borrower will be
highly correlated if both entities contribute to the production of the
same outputs, or if one entity holds a large equity stake in the other.
Therefore, the contingent liabilities created by guarantees in which the
guarantor and borrower are under common control will almost invari-
ably have high internal correlations, producing large expected wealth
transfers away from the guarantors' unsecured creditors. On the other
hand, common control guarantees may generate important economic
efficiencies, especially if the guarantor is better positioned than the
lender to monitor the borrower. For this reason, and because an ex-
tensive literature on these arrangements already exists, common con-
trol guarantees deserve a more thorough treatment than could be pro-
vided here. Nonetheless, they serve as a useful reminder that the
hazard of correlation-seeking goes well beyond financial derivatives,
and that a comprehensive legal response must do so as well.
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